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Abstract 
 
This dissertation discusses the access to finance of mostly financially 
constrained firms on several dimensions. The first study
1
 investigates the 
relationship between corporate leverage and the asset structure. It appears 
that non-current assets are more important sources of collateral than current 
assets. The collateral channel is more pronounced for bank-dependent 
firms, but it weakened the most for these firms during the crisis. The second 
study
2
 investigates whether SMEs receive more trade credit after they 
experienced a negative shock to bank credit. This ability to substitute 
depends in a positive way on the credit quality of the firms and the stage of 
the economy. Moderately financially constrained firms are most likely to 
substitute. The third study investigates how several variables related to 
banking sector development, stock market development and legal 
development affect the access to SME finance. The main finding is that 
SME’s have better access to finance if they are located in countries with a 
competitive banking sector, with a strong preference for long debt maturity, 
with high quality credit registries, with liquid and low-volatile stock 
markets and with strong creditor protection rights.   
  
                                                          
1
 The description of the first study is based on the written abstract used in Norden, L., Van 
Kampen, S. (2013). Corporate Leverage and the Collateral Channel. Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 37(12), 5062-5072 
2
 The description of the second study is based on the written abstract used in Norden, L., 
Van Kampen, S., Illueca, M. (2017). Substitution effects in private debt: evidence from 
SMEs. Working Paper Series. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
The foundation for corporate finance research was laid in 1958 with the 
irrelevance theorem of Modigliani and Miller. Several important theories 
on how firms fund themselves have emerged since then. Most importantly, 
there is the trade-off theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1963; Kraus and 
Litzenberger, 1973), the pecking-order theory (Donaldson, 1961; Myers 
and Majluf, 1984) and the market-timing theory (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002).          
 In reality, these theories do not apply to all firms in the same way. 
There is a lot of empirical research that provides evidence that there are 
determinants of corporate leverage unaccounted for in each of these 
theories. Some important examples are financial constraints (e.g. Fazzari, 
Hubbard and Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997), the access to the 
public debt market (Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Kisgen, 2006, 2009), 
the size of the firm, (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008), the 
sensitivity towards information asymmetry (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), 
industry variation (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim, 1984; Kahle and Walkling, 
1996), the place in the economic cycle (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), the 
stability of the banking sector (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) and the 
differences in the institutional contexts across countries (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Haselmann, Pistor and Vig, 2010). 
 In addition, we assume in these theories that debt is relatively 
homogeneous, while it is in fact very heterogeneous. Several examples of 
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the different forms of debt would be; short-term bank loans, long-term bank 
loans, lines-of-credit, government subsidies, trade credit, subordinated bank 
debt, informal loans, corporate bonds, government bonds and 
crowdfunding. All these types of debt have different levels of status, 
security and maturity and therefore the dependency on each of them differs 
a lot across firms and industries. For example, the importance of (a 
particular source of) bank debt is highly dependent on the used lending 
technologies (Berger and Black, 2011). Moreover, for SMEs or other 
financially constrained firms relationship lending is the most important 
lending technology. Banks that maintain close and long-lasting 
relationships with their clients are better able to assess the creditworthiness 
of their clientele, resulting in more beneficial borrowing terms for their 
clients (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). On the contrary, large and transparent 
firms rely more on transaction-based lending (e.g. Bharath, Dahiya, 
Saunders and Srinivasan, 2011). The importance of alternative forms of 
debt also differs across firms. Trade credit for instance, seems to be more 
relevant for financially constrained firms (Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013).      
 Investigating the heterogeneity of debt is especially important for 
SMEs and large private firms because large public firms can almost always 
fall back on public securities in order to fund themselves. For this reason, 
SMEs and large private firms are more dependent on private debt than large 
publicly listed firms. In spite of this, private firms (especially SMEs) have 
more difficulties in attracting debt than public firms because they are less 
transparent and therefore considered as more risky by several lending 
institutions (Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006).   
17 
 
 In this dissertation, I address both several determinants of corporate 
finance and the heterogeneity of debt. In other words, the goal of this 
dissertation is to elaborate on several drivers of the acquisitions among 
different forms of external finance. As addressed above, investigating the 
heterogeneity of debt is most important for SMEs. For this reason, two out 
of three chapters are based on empirical findings for SMEs.  
 The first study in this dissertation can be found in chapter 2. This 
chapter investigates how the asset structure of a firm affects corporate 
leverage. In former literature, it is found that strong asset tangibility and/or 
asset redeployability has a positive effect on leverage. This is because 
tangible and/or redeployable assets can be pledged as collateral in case the 
firm defaults and therefore mitigates problems related to information 
asymmetry (e.g. Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot, Thakor and Udell, 1991; 
Leary, 2009; Campello and Giambona, 2013). Firms can use several assets 
with varying levels of tangibility and redeployability as collateral in a loan 
application. In the literature, it is not yet widely investigated how these 
individual forms of tangible/redeployable assets affect corporate leverage. 
Therefore the first main contribution of this chapter is that it investigates 
the effect of several types of assets (i.e. PPE, inventories and accounts 
receivables) on the leverage ratio. The second contribution is that it also 
considers how the effect of the collateral channel could differ across firms 
and over time by measuring the differences for bank-dependent vis-à-vis 
bank-independent firms and crisis vis-à-vis non-crisis periods respectively. 
 The first main finding of this chapter is that PPE is the most important 
source of collateral in explaining long-term leverage, while accounts 
receivables is the most important contributor in explaining short-term 
18 
 
leverage. This finding confirms the asset-liability match of Chung (1993). 
The second main finding is that all three types of assets are weaker sources 
of collateral during the 2007-09 financial crisis. In other words, tangible 
assets are less useful as collateral during times when collateral is actually 
needed the most (because there is more uncertainty during a crisis and 
therefore banks generally ask for more collateral). However, the usefulness 
of asset tangibility in receiving debt finance during the crisis only decreases 
for bank-dependent firms (which are the firms who need the collateral the 
most). The value of the collateral for bank-independent firms (i.e. firms 
who have access to public debt markets) seems to be unaffected by the 
financial crisis.        
 The second study of this dissertation can be found in chapter 3. This 
chapter investigates the nature of the relationship between two important 
sources of credit; bank credit and trade credit and the main drivers of this 
relationship. As addressed earlier, alternative sources of credit are more 
important for SMEs. Therefore, this study is based on SMEs only. In 
former literature, it is assumed that bank credit and trade credit are 
substitutes of one another (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Biais and Gollier, 
1997). This implies that firms who are unable to attract bank credit due to 
their high levels of financial constraints attract trade credit from their 
suppliers instead. Relatedly, Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga 
(2013) report that firms that are unconstrained are able to collect credit 
from the bank and that they redistribute parts of the credit they have 
received from banks to their bank-constrained customers in the form of 
trade credit. However, there are reasons to suspect that this substitution 
relationship might not always hold. Most important, trade credit does not 
19 
 
create any cash inflow and therefore is by definition less flexible than bank 
credit. Put differently, trade credit cannot always be used for the same 
purposes as bank credit (Breza and Liberman, 2017). In addition, the 
providers of trade credit (i.e. suppliers) are on aggregate getting more 
constrained themselves during a financial crisis. Therefore, they might be 
more reluctant to step in as alternative finance providers during times of 
crisis (Yang, 2011). This would imply that firms that are excluded from 
bank credit also are excluded from trade credit, and hence that bank credit 
and trade credit are complementary. This study investigates whether bank 
credit and trade credit have a substitution or a complementary relationship. 
Moreover, it tries to find an answer what actually causes the nature of this 
relationship. The answer is that substitution and complementary 
relationships are - on average - almost equally likely to occur. However, the 
nature of the relationship is quite volatile over time. During economic 
booms, firms who do not have access to bank credit can indeed fall back on 
their suppliers most of the times. However, the opposite is true during 
economic recessions. Also, the paper reports that the Altman’s Z-score 
(Altman, 1968) of the firm has a positive effect on the likelihood of 
substitution. This indicates that only firms who reach a certain level of 
credit quality are able to fall back on their suppliers when banks cut their 
lending, implying that substituting bank credit for trade credit is not that 
easy as initially assumed in the literature.     
 The third study of this dissertation can be found in chapter 4. Also this 
study is fully based on finance for SMEs. While the previous chapters have 
been focusing on firm-level determinants of finance, this chapter focuses on 
country-level determinants. The goal of this study is to investigate how 
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several country characteristics related to banking sector development, stock 
market development and legal development affect the access to finance for 
SMEs in general and the choices between several forms of external finance 
(e.g. bank finance, trade credit, informal finance, subordinated debt and 
equity) in particular. Next to this, it sheds light on which country 
characteristics help SMEs to attract external finance during times of crisis. 
This is a very relevant topic, since SMEs are more sensitive to cyclicality 
than large publicly listed firms (Behr, Foos and Norden, 2017).   
 The most important findings from the banking sector development 
variables are that SMEs have easier access to finance when more mature 
debt is issued, when banking sectors are competitive and if the quality of 
the credit registries is high. These results hold both for bank finance and 
non-bank finance (and for bank finance during crisis periods). SMEs who 
cannot access bank finance during a crisis in a developed banking sector 
seem to have troubles in attracting other forms of external finance though. 
 From the stock market development variables it appears that liquidity 
and inverse risk are important positive contributors to the access to almost 
all forms of finance. This probably is because stock market stability signals 
optimism about opportunities in the near future, making finance providers 
more willing to extend credit. Stock market stability does not seem to help 
in acquiring external finance during times of crisis though.   
 From the legal development variables, it is found that creditor 
protection rights are highly important to improve the access to finance for 
SMEs. This is because lenders are more willing to provide a loan when 
their rights are better protected in case of default. SMEs located in countries 
with strong creditor protection rights have easier access to both bank 
21 
 
finance and non-bank finance. However, these protection rights do not 
work optimally during a crisis.     
 In a separate section, this chapter investigates how these same country 
characteristics affect the likelihood of substituting bank credit for 
alternative sources of finance. In chapter 3 of this dissertation, the 
likelihood to substitute bank credit for trade credit appeared to be quite 
different across countries. For this reason, it is interesting to investigate 
which country characteristics actually explain these differences in the 
likelihood of substitution. The variables addressed above all have a positive 
effect on the likelihood that trade creditors are willing to step in as 
alternative finance providers when banks cut their lending to SMEs. To a 
smaller extent, this also holds for informal lenders and private equity 
providers. These findings indicate that a well-developed institutional 
context is a positive contributor for several non-bank parties to extend 
finance to SMEs, even in the scenario when SMEs are rationed from banks.   
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Chapter 2       
Corporate Leverage and the Collateral Channel
3
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Debt is an important and very flexible source of external corporate finance. 
Firms can raise debt in various forms, such as public vs. private debt (bonds 
and commercial papers vs. bank loans and trade credit), long-term vs. short-
term, senior vs. junior debt, secured vs. unsecured, or any combination of 
these dimensions. Frictions at the firm-level and the entire economy, 
especially asymmetric information between firms and lenders, are the key 
factors that influence the availability of debt finance to firms and its form 
(e.g., Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap, 
Lamont and Stein, 1995). Furthermore, lending technologies and country 
characteristics such as the financial system, the banking system and the 
legal environment, affect the scale and scope of debt finance (e.g., Berger 
and Udell, 2006; Djankov,McLiesh and Shleifer 2007; Haselmann, Pistor 
and Vig, 2010). 
 In this paper, we investigate the relation between corporate asset 
structure and leverage to provide new evidence on the collateral channel. 
Earlier theoretical and empirical research has shown that particular forms of 
debt finance, for example, lending against collateral, help mitigating ex ante 
and ex post informational problems, such as adverse selection and moral 
                                                          
3
 This chapter is based on Norden, L., Van Kampen, S. (2013). Corporate Leverage and the 
Collateral Channel. Journal of Banking and Finance, 37(12), 5062-5072. 
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hazard (see, for example, Chan and Thakor, 1987; Boot, Thakor and Udell, 
1991; Rajan and Winton, 1995; Faulkender and Petersen, 2006; Leary, 
2009; Berger, Frame and Ioannidou, 2011). The main motivation for our 
study is, in addition to the general link between assets and debt as a source 
of finance for these assets, that certain assets are better suited to serve as 
collateral for debt finance than others. Originally, the corporate finance 
literature has focused on asset tangibility as major driver of the collateral 
channel, while recent research emphasizes that asset redeployability - 
which partly overlaps with tangibility - matters (e.g., Campello and 
Giambona, 2013; Hall, 2012; Campello and Hackbarth, 2012; Chaney, 
Sraer and Thesmar, 2012). The collateral channel is one mechanism that 
helps explaining the cross-sectional variation in the access to debt finance 
and financing terms at the firm and industry level (e.g., Benmelech and 
Bergman, 2009). Indeed, the literature on corporate financial constraints 
has pointed out that limited access to credit and prohibitively high costs of 
credit are major determinants of financial constraints that prevent firms 
from funding all desired investments (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 
1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Almeida, Campello and Weisbach., 
2004; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Hadlock and Pierce, 2010). In other words, 
asset redeployability strengthens the collateral channel, which in turn, 
reduces corporate financial constraints. 
 Next to the ex ante and ex post incentive effects, there is evidence that 
the use of redeployable collateral reduces the lender’s expected and realized 
loss-given-default (e.g., Davydenko and Franks, 2008; Grunert and Weber, 
2009; Calabrese and Zenga, 2010; Khieu, Mullineaux and Yi, 2012), and 
bank regulators and supervisors have recognized the risk-mitigation effect 
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of collateral in the Basel II and III capital adequacy frameworks (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006; Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2011). 
 Moreover, the maturity structure of firms’ assets might affect the 
maturity structure of corporate debt. Next to the trivial financing link 
between assets and liabilities, it is reasonable to expect that short-term 
assets are likely to serve as collateral for short-term debt (e.g., trade credit 
or lines of credit from banks), while long-term (fixed) assets are likely to 
serve as collateral for long-term debt (e.g., long-term investment loans, 
commercial real estate mortgages). 
 While the benefits of the collateral channel theoretically apply to all 
firms, they should be particularly relevant to firms that are subject to 
stronger frictions. Large, transparent and financially unconstrained firms 
typically have access to public and private debt, while small, 
informationally opaque and financially constrained firms typically have to 
rely on private debt as source of external finance (i.e., bank loans and/or 
trade credit). Given that private debt is more likely to be secured than 
public debt, we expect the collateral channel to be more relevant for firms 
that have to rely on private debt financing.  
 Another question that has not been extensively studied yet is whether 
and how the strength of the collateral channel varies over time. Ivashina 
and Scharfstein (2010) document a sharp decline in US bank lending during 
the global financial crisis, but there is little evidence on potential changes in 
the strength of the collateral channel, especially during the different stages 
of the crisis. The survey conducted by Campello, Graham and Harvey 
(2010) suggests that financially constrained firms suffered the most during 
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the crisis. Moreover, Becker and Ivashina (2014) show that firms with 
access to bond markets are able to substitute the decrease in bank debt 
during economic downturns with corporate bond issues, while firms that 
depend on private debt cannot. 
 Based on a large panel dataset of US firms from 1990 to 2010, we 
investigate the cross-sectional and time-varying importance of the collateral 
channel. First, we find a strong and positive relation between firms’ 
leverage at time t and their asset structure at time t-1. We show that 
property, plant and equipment are the major determinants of the collateral 
channel. Other redeployable assets such as inventories and receivables also 
matter, but to a lesser extent. We control for firms’ growth and investment 
opportunities, bank-dependence, profitability, time fixed effects, and 
industry fixed effects. Moreover, we obtain similar results when we use 
first differences of the asset structure variables and leverage. Various 
robustness tests, including Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969), indicate 
that our results are not driven by autocorrelation or endogeneity problems. 
Second, we show that property, plant and equipment are significantly 
positively related to long-term leverage (but not to short-term leverage), 
and receivables are positively related to short-term leverage. Third, we 
document that the collateral channel is more important for firms that cannot 
access public debt markets but have to rely on banks and trade creditors to 
raise debt. Fourth, we provide new evidence that the collateral channel has 
become weaker for bank-dependent firms after the start of the global 
financial crisis, while it remained unchanged for firms that can access 
public debt markets. 
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 The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2.2 we develop our 
main hypotheses about the collateral channel. In Section 2.3 we describe 
the data and explain the methodology. In Section 2.4 we report the results 
of our analysis of the link between corporate asset structure and leverage, 
the influence of bank-dependence, changes during the global financial 
crisis, and further empirical checks. Section 2.5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
Related studies suggest that the functioning of the collateral channel 
depends on the redeployability of the pledged assets (e.g., Campello and 
Giambona, 2013, Campello and Hackbarth, 2012; Chaney et al., 2012). 
Most obvious candidates for easily redeployable collateral are real estate, 
inventories and accounts receivable. It has been well-documented that 
certain assets frequently serve as collateral in the asset-based finance (e.g., 
Udell, 2004). While real estate and inventories are tangible assets, accounts 
receivable are financial claims on the firms’ customers that emerge from 
standardized trade credit agreements. Despite their intangible nature, 
receivables are relatively liquid because they can be assigned to the bank 
and/or sold to factoring companies. Counter-examples of assets that exhibit 
a low redeployability are firm-specific machinery, and various types of 
(opaque) intangibles (e.g., goodwill, brand names, patents, etc.). Asset 
redeployability requires a low asset-specificity, low informational 
asymmetry about the asset value, and as a consequence of the first two 
characteristics, liquid asset markets. As a side note, we do not consider 
firms’ cash holdings here since they do usually not serve as collateral; we 
will come back to the role of cash in Section 2.4.4. Following this 
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reasoning we propose H1 to examine how corporate asset structure 
influences the functioning of the collateral channel. 
 
H1: A higher fraction of redeployable assets (property, plant and 
equipment; inventories; and receivables) is associated with higher total 
leverage. 
 
 Conventional wisdom suggests that the life of corporate assets and the 
maturity of corporate liabilities are matched. Short-term assets (working 
capital: inventories and receivables) should be funded with short-term 
finance (e.g., trade credit or lines of credit from banks), and long-term 
assets (property, plant and equipment) should be funded with long-term 
finance (e.g., equity, long-term bonds, or long-term bank loans). This 
rationale is confirmed in many studies (e.g. Chung, 1993). However, this 
reasoning might differ in the case of secured debt finance. The borrower’s 
risk of default and lender’s collateral requirements might weaken the 
maturity match of assets and liabilities but strengthen the collateral channel. 
In other words, firms with a higher fraction of deployable assets exhibit a 
higher leverage independent of the asset-liability maturity structure. To 
investigate this issue, we test whether a higher fraction of short-term (long-
term) assets is associated with a higher short-term (long-term) leverage. 
 
H2a: Long-term assets (property, plant and equipment) are positively 
related with long-term leverage. 
H2b: Short-term assets (inventories and receivables) are positively related 
with short-term leverage. 
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 In a next step, we take firms’ main sources of finance into account (i.e., 
issuing bonds vs. borrowing from banks and trade creditors). The existence 
of a bond rating indicates that the firm has access to public debt markets. 
Given that straight corporate bonds are typically unsecured, bond issuers 
are not or less dependent on the collateral channel. In contrast, firms 
without a bond rating have to rely on bank loans (and to a smaller extent on 
trade credit) to finance their business. Bank loans are often partially secured 
debt, and trade credit is almost always fully secured. Related studies have 
considered the non-existence of a bond rating as a proxy of firms’ bank-
dependence, credit constraints and financial constraints (e.g., Faulkender 
and Petersen, 2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 
2011). Thus, we propose H3 to study the importance of the collateral 
channel conditional on firms’ bank dependence. 
 
 H3: The collateral channel matters more for bank-dependent firms than 
for other firms. 
 
 In a final step, we examine whether the functioning of the collateral 
channel has changed during the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. On the 
one hand, the severity of the financial crisis might have led to a 
strengthening of the collateral channel. Banks tightened their lending 
standards, increasingly switched from relationship lending to arm’s length 
lending and asset-based finance, and therefore might have increased their 
collateral requirements. Campello and Giambona (2013) find that the 
relationship between asset redeployability and leverage is stronger in 
recessionary times. Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show that binding credit 
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restrictions are the result of the state of the economy. This reasoning 
suggests a strengthening of the collateral channel in hard times. 
 On the other hand, the collateral channel could have become weaker 
during the financial crisis for the following reasons. First, given that banks 
reduced their new lending during the crisis, it is possible that the link 
between the level of corporate leverage and the level of redeployable assets 
has become weaker, in particular for bank-dependent borrowers. Second, 
Campello, Graham and Harvey (2010) provide survey evidence that 
financially constrained firms, because of the unavailability of external 
finance and shortfalls in cash flows, used asset sales to fund to their 
operations. It is likely that those firms sold the most redeployable assets, 
which further reduces the link between asset structure and leverage. Third, 
the market value of corporate assets dropped substantially (for real estate 
faster than for others), reducing their suitability as collateral for new bank 
loans. Fourth, firms that managed to obtain new bank loans during the crisis 
might belong to the highest credit quality in the market and therefore 
collateral requirements could actually have decreased. In other words, the 
average credit quality of those firms that continued to be active borrowers 
during the crisis might be higher compared to pre-crisis times, therefore the 
average collateral requirements lower. Related, there is evidence that high-
quality borrowers indeed managed to issue (unsecured) corporate bonds 
during the crisis to compensate for the reduction of credit supply by banks 
(e.g., Becker and Ivashina, 2014). As explained above, the collateral 
channel plays no important role for firms that can issue unsecured debt such 
as corporate bonds or commercial papers. Based on this reasoning, we 
propose H4. 
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H4: The collateral channel (i.e., the link between redeployable assets and 
leverage) became weaker during the crisis, especially for bank-dependent 
borrowers. 
 
2.3 Data and empirical method 
2.3.1 Data 
 We base our study on quarterly accounting data for US firms from the 
database COMPUSTAT North America covering the period from 1990 to 
2010. We apply the following filter rules and data processing steps. First, 
we only consider firms that are constituents of the S&P 1,500 index in 
COMPUSTAT. We only select companies that are included in the S&P 
1,500 for at least 14 years in our 21 year sample period to obtain a strongly 
balanced panel. A strongly balanced panel has the advantage that we can 
study the relationship between leverage and asset structure of the same 
firms over time. An unbalanced panel would complicate the time-series 
analysis and make the interpretation of the results difficult. Second, we 
follow the common practice in corporate finance research and exclude 
firms with two-digit SIC codes 40-49 (utilities) and 60-64 (financials) (e.g. 
Fama and French, 2001; Kisgen, 2006; Bates, Kahle and Stulz, 2009). The 
reason for excluding these types of industries is because they are heavily 
regulated and exhibit a very special asset-liability structure, which could 
distort our analysis. Third, we also drop firms with discontinued time series 
because of financial distress, bankruptcy, and leveraged buy-outs. Fourth, 
we winsorize all variables at the 1% and 99% percentile, which is a widely 
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used approach to deal with outliers in empirical corporate finance and 
accounting research (e.g., Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Byoun, 2008; Frank and 
Goyal, 2009). Our final sample comprises 553 listed US firms. 
2.3.2 Main variables and descriptive statistics 
 To study the functioning of the collateral channel we collected the 
following variables on firms’ debt financing; (i) leverage, defined as total 
debt over total assets of the firm in year-quarter t, (ii) short-term leverage, 
defined as debt with maturities of less than one year over total assets of the 
firm in year-quarter t, and (iii) long-term leverage, defined as debt with 
maturities of more than one year over total assets of the firm in year-quarter 
t.  
 Furthermore, we collect information on the asset structure of the firms 
in our sample and consider the corresponding variables as proxies for the 
(actual and potential) collateral used in debt finance. All these variables are 
normalized over total assets from the same firm and year-quarter. The most 
important asset item is property, plant and equipment (PPE). In the baseline 
analysis we take the net value of PPE and not the gross value of PPE 
because the net value is likely more closely related to the market value of 
PPE. Nonetheless, we also use gross PPE in a robustness test. If a firm 
defaults and has pledged PPE as collateral, the collateral value tends to be 
closer to the net PPE from the most recent financial statement than to the 
gross PPE. This is supported by Desai, Fritz Foley and Hiner Jr. (2004) and 
Wang and Thornhill (2010) who use the net PPE as a proxy for asset 
tangibility and collateral, respectively. Moreover, Herrmann, Saudagaran 
and Thomas (2006) conclude that financial decision makers find it very 
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important to know the fair value of a firm’s fixed assets. This indicates that 
net PPE is a better proxy than gross PPE because net PPE is more related to 
the fair value of the fixed assets rather than the gross PPE. Based on these 
findings we conclude that using net PPE is an appropriate choice for our 
baseline regression model. 
 Nonetheless, we also use gross PPE in a robustness check because 
companies have some discretion in determining how they depreciate their 
assets. In that respect, gross PPE is less influenced by firm-specific 
depreciation policies. Moreover, gross PPE is less likely to create 
multicollinearity problems with other assets. This is because all other asset 
variables are bounded between zero and one, while gross PPE can exceed 
one. This is due to the fact that all asset variables other than gross PPE have 
the same denominator in each time-section and this denominator is always 
bigger than the numerator. In turn, this means that the asset variables have a 
natural relationship with each other, which could yield in high correlations. 
Because gross PPE can exceed a value of one (because the value of gross 
PPE can be bigger than the value of total assets in the same year-quarter) 
the link between the asset variables becomes weaker when including gross 
PPE in the model, which ultimately reduces potential effects from 
multicollinearity. In unreported analysis, we have checked the variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for the asset variables. We find that, as expected, 
taking gross PPE decreases the VIFs. However, the VIFs for the regressions 
with net PPE are also not high (between 1.6 and 2.6) indicating that 
including net PPE in the regression is unlikely to create multicollinearity. 
This allows us to include net PPE in our main analysis. Another reason to 
consider the gross PPE is that Tuzel (2010) found that firms with a high 
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amount of real estate assets (with PPE as a proxy) are more risky because it 
is difficult for them to change their asset structure due to the fact that PPE 
depreciates slowly. Thus, it could be that the relation between corporate 
leverage and collateral changes when the difference between gross PPE and 
net PPE gets bigger over time.      
 Furthermore, we consider firms’ inventories. The value of inventories is 
equal to the sum of raw materials, work-in-progress and finished goods. 
Since many firms do not distinguish between several types of inventories in 
their financial statements we consider the aggregate value. We also 
consider firms’ receivables, which correspond to the total amount to be 
received from their customers. Receivables correspond to the value of 
goods the firm has delivered to its customers under trade credit agreements. 
In an additional empirical test, we also examine the role of cash holdings, 
which is the amount of cash and liquid short-term investments.  
 The following variables are used as controls and/or in further empirical 
checks. We use the logarithm of Tobin’s Q (market-to-book ratio) to 
control for firms’ growth and investment opportunities that might affect 
firms’ capital structure. We also control for profitability by including the 
logarithm of net income. The dummy variable “Rated” indicates whether 
firms have a bond rating in a particular year-quarter. “Rating” indicates the 
bond rating level and is measured on an ordinal scale from 1 (AAA) to 26 
(D). The rating corresponds to the S&P Domestic Long Term Issuer Credit 
Rating from COMPUSTAT. We also define two indicator variables to 
capture potential effects of the global financial crisis on the importance of 
the collateral channel. “Subprime crisis” is a dummy variable equals one 
for the period from August 2007 to August 2008, and zero otherwise. 
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“Post-Lehman crisis” is a dummy variable equals one for the period from 
September 2008 to December 2010, and zero otherwise. 
 Table 2.1 provides descriptive statistics of our main variables (the 
leverage and asset structure variables are normalized by total assets). It 
indicates that the mean leverage is 0.22. The mean of long-term leverage is 
0.18 and thus accounts for the biggest part of firms’ debt financing. The 
mean of net PPE (gross PPE) is 0.30 (0.60), inventories is 0.16, and the 
mean of receivables is 0.17. The mean cash holdings amount to 0.11. The 
skewness levels are very low and most kurtosis levels are not much bigger 
than 3 (below 3 most of the times). Hence, there is no reason to assume 
severe non-normality. Only short-term leverage and cash have higher 
kurtosis values, which is because this are the only leverage and asset 
structure variables where the standard error is bigger than the mean (thus 
that have a CV which is bigger than 1). Given that the average deviation 
from the mean and the median are highly similar and the asymmetry values 
are low, we assume that the variables are approximately normally 
distributed. The metrics we have used to determine the distribution of the 
variables are based on the work of Calabrese and Zenga (2008). The mean 
log of Tobin’s Q is 0.76. Table 2.1 presents the winsorized values of all our 
variables. All variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% centile, which 
means that if an observation has a value that is smaller (bigger) than the 1% 
(99%) centile this observation gets a value equal to the value of the 1% 
(99%)
 
centile. This is done to diminish the influence of outliers. Because 
table 2.1 is winsorized already, the winsorized values for the variables 
equal the minimum and maximum values. Furthermore, Figure 2.1 displays 
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the time series of the quarterly cross-sectional means of leverage (Figure 
2.1a) and asset structure (Figure 2.1b) of the firms in our sample.  
 We observe credit ratings from S&P in COMPUSTAT for 43% of the 
firms and the mean rating is 8 (= BBB+) on an ordinal scale from 1 (= 
AAA) to 26 (= D). Figure 2.2 displays a histogram of the firms’ credit 
ratings. The vast majority of the rated firms in our dataset are from the 
investment grade category (AAA-BBB). 
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Figure 2.1: 
Cross-sectional mean of leverage and asset structure over time 
 
Figure 1a: leverage 
 
Figure 1b: asset structure
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Figure 2.2: Histogram of firms’ credit ratings from S&P 
 
 
 
 
2.3.3 Empirical Method 
 We investigate whether a higher fraction of redeployable assets is 
associated with higher leverage, as proposed by H1. Specifically, we 
estimate a multivariate regression model to investigate whether firms’ PPE, 
inventories, and receivables at time t-1 are significantly positively related to 
total leverage at time t, as shown in Equation (2.1). 
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𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜙𝐶𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡          (2.1) 
 
In Equation (2.1), C represents a vector of control variables (Tobin’s Q, the 
“Rated” dummy and profitability), η represents the industry fixed effects 
and 𝜆 the year-quarter fixed effects. The asset variables are normalized by 
total assets and lagged by one quarter to avoid potential endogeneity 
problems (i.e., assets in t-1 might serve as collateral for debt finance in t but 
debt at time t could not have been used to finance assets that were already 
in place at time t-1; we will revisit this point in more detail in Section 
2.4.4). PPE is measured by its net value from the balance sheet but 
alternatively we also use gross PPE because the latter has a lower 
correlation with the other asset variables, reducing potential problems due 
to multicollinearity, as explained in Section 2.3.2. Equation (2.1) is also 
used to test the maturity-matching hypothesis, as discussed in H2. In order 
to do so we reestimate the regression model from Equation (2.1) for long-
term and short-term leverage separately. Equation (2.1) is estimated with 
two model specifications. Our base specification is a cross-sectional time-
series pooled OLS regression model with year-quarter fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects to control for unobserved time and industry-specific 
heterogeneity. We also estimate panel data regressions with year-quarter 
fixed effects and industry fixed effects to check the robustness of our 
results (see, for example, Greene (2008), Verbeek (2012) for background 
information on both types of regressions). In both models we use robust 
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level to deal with 
heteroskedasticity.  
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 As the panel covers 84 year-quarters and both corporate leverage and 
the asset structure of firms do not change very much in the short run, the 
regression with the variable levels as shown in equation (2.1) might be 
affected by autocorrelation. In order to circumvent potential problems due 
to of autocorrelation in the variable levels, we repeat the regression in 
Equation (2.1) as a first-difference regression, as shown in Equation (2.2).  
 
∆𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3∆𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡             
          (2.2) 
 In the next step, we estimate the effect of bank dependence by adding 
the dummy variable “Rated” to the analysis, as proposed by H3. To test the 
impact of bank dependence on the collateral channel we add the dummy 
variable “Rated” and its interaction terms with all asset structure variables, 
as shown in Equation (2.3). 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽5(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) + 𝛽7𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 +
𝜂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡        (2.3) 
 
 As stated in H4, we want to test the impact of the interplay of the 
financial crisis and firms’ bank dependence on the functioning of the 
collateral channel. To do so, we add an indicator variable for the financial 
crisis and its interactions with the asset structure variables to the model, as 
shown in Equation (2.4). For expositional reasons “Crisis” in Equation (2.4) 
stands for the dummy variable “Subprime Crisis” and the dummy variable 
“Post-Lehman Crisis”, which we add simultaneously to the model to take 
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into account the different stages of the financial crisis. The regression for 
equation (2.4) is performed separately for rated and unrated firms. 
 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝛽4(𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽5(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠) + 𝛽6(𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)  + 𝛽7𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 +
𝜂𝑗𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (2.4) 
 
2.4 Empirical analysis 
2.4.1 The relationship between asset structure and leverage  
 The baseline analysis on the relationship between asset structure and 
leverage has been formulated in equation (2.1), explained in section 2.3.3. 
Table 2 reports the results for equation (2.1). 
 Model (1) in Table 2.2 shows that firms’ net PPE and receivables are 
significantly positively related with leverage, while there is no effect for 
inventories. The coefficient of net PPE equals 0.165 and the one of 
receivables 0.120. This means that an increase of 1% in net PPE 
(receivables) results in a 0.165% (0.120%) increase in leverage. The effect 
of net PPE on leverage is also economically significant because an increase 
from the 25th to the 75th percentile would result in a 4.125%=(0.40-
0.15)*0.165 increase in leverage. Considering that the average value of 
total assets in our sample is 7.269 billion dollars, we obtain 0.3 billion 
dollars of additional debt (=0.04125*7.269 billion). The economic 
significance is lower for receivables because an increase from the 25th to 
the 75th percentile results in a 1.56%=(0.22-0.09)*0.12 increase in 
leverage, corresponding to 0.113 billion dollars of additional debt. Model 
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(2) shows the estimation results of a panel regression with time and 
industry fixed effects and confirms the findings for net PPE and 
inventories, while receivables loses its significance. Model (3) indicates 
that also gross PPE is positively related to leverage, confirming the earlier 
results on net PPE but the significance of the estimated coefficients (but not 
the sign) of inventories and receivables changes. In Model (3) we 
demonstrate that the PPE variable is robust for the type of measurement. 
However, we also find that net PPE better explains total leverage because 
the adjusted R
2 
decreases from 18.8% to 16.4% when we use gross PPE. 
When we control for growth opportunities by adding Tobin’s Q, the rating 
indicator variable and firms’ lagged profitability, the estimated coefficients 
of net PPE, inventories and receivables in Model (4) are similar to those in 
Model (1).  
 In addition, the coefficient of “Rated” is significantly positive and the 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q is significantly negative. This means that firms 
with access to the public debt market have a higher leverage and that firms 
with higher growth opportunities have a lower leverage, which is in line 
with the related literature. In our sample, rated firms have a 9.1% higher 
leverage than unrated firms, while firms with a Tobin’s Q at the 75th 
percentile have 5.3% lower leverage than those at the 25th percentile (=-
0.073(1.08-0.35)). Profitability barely plays a role because it is both 
statistically and economically not significant.  
 In Model (5) we re-estimate Model (1) with leverage and all 
explanatory variables adjusted by the corresponding median values of firms 
that are rated (i) AAA-A, (ii) BBB, (iii) BB and lower, and (iv) unrated  
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firms. Using these median-adjusted variables we find similar results than in 
Model (1). In unreported analysis we re-estimate all five models on yearly 
data to reduce potential problems associated with autocorrelation and obtain 
qualitatively similar results. The evidence suggests that property, plant and 
equipment are the key driver of the collateral channel. Moreover, higher 
receivables are also associated with more total leverage, while the role of 
inventories is less clear. Our findings on net PPE, and to a lesser extent 
those on receivables, provide evidence in favor of Hypothesis H1, while the 
findings on inventories do not allow us to corroborate H1. 
 In a next step we investigate whether these results change, as stated in 
Hypothesis H2, when we use long-term and short-term leverage instead of 
total leverage as dependent variable in our regression models. Table 2.3 
presents the corresponding results. 
 This analysis yields three results. First, we find a significantly positive 
coefficient for net PPE in the OLS and panel regressions for long-term 
leverage, but no significant coefficient in the regressions for short-term 
leverage. This result is support for Hypothesis H2, suggesting that long-
term assets are used as collateral for long-term debt but not short-term debt. 
Second, inventories display a significantly negative coefficient in the long-
term leverage regression, indicating that inventories are not or little used as 
collateral for long-term debt. Surprisingly, we cannot find a positive effect 
of inventories on short-term leverage. Thus, the findings on inventories are 
rather mixed. Third, receivables are unrelated to long-term leverage but 
significantly positively related to short-term leverage, which is in line with 
Hypothesis H2. Overall, our findings on net PPE and receivables are largely 
consistent with the view that asset maturity (i.e., the life of the collateral) is 
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Table 2.3: The relationship between long-term and short-term leverage 
and asset structure 
This table reports results from regression analyses with long-term and short-leverage at time t as dependent 
variable and net property, plant and equipment (net PPE; alternatively gross PPE), inventories, and receivables 
measured at time t-1 as explanatory variables. We report the estimation results for cross-sectional time-series 
pooled OLS regressions with industry and time fixed effects, and panel data regressions with industry fixed 
effects. The analysis is based on 553 US firms for the period 1990-2010. ***, **, * indicate coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, using robust standard errors clustered within firms. A1 
stands for the average absolute error term and A2 for the square root of the mean squared error term. 
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related to the maturity of corporate debt. However, we do neither find 
negative effects of long-term assets on short-term leverage nor negative 
effects of short-term assets on long-term leverage. The only exception are 
inventories – we find such effect in Model (1), but not the expected positive 
effect in Model (2). Thus, we conclude that there is a significant but not 
perfect link between asset and debt maturity. 
 So far we have investigated the link between the levels of asset 
structure and corporate leverage. Because both asset structure and corporate 
leverage are likely to exhibit autocorrelation we use lagged first differences 
of all variables (i.e., the changes from time t-2 to t-1) and re-estimate the 
previous models for all types of leverage at time t. Table 2.4 reports the 
findings from the first-difference regressions. 
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We obtain qualitatively similar (and quantitatively weaker) results for the 
relationship between changes in leverage and changes in net PPE. Changes 
in long-term leverage cannot be explained with changes in any of the asset 
variables. The insignificant results for the changes in long-term leverage 
can be explained with the fact that long-term leverage changes little from 
one quarter to another. In contrast, for short-term leverage, we obtain 
positive coefficients for changes in net PPE and inventories, and a 
significantly negative coefficient for receivables. We repeated all 
regressions for each asset variable separately (with controls) and confirm 
that the results are not affected by multicollinearity. We interpret the results 
on net PPE and inventories as supportive for the collateral channel, with 
collateral pledged to bank lenders or trade creditors. The negative effect of 
receivables can be explained if a large part of the change in short-term debt 
is due to an increase in accounts payable, which are typically secured with 
inventories. 
2.4.2 The collateral channel and bank dependence 
 Our previous findings indicate that net property, plant and equipment, 
and to a lesser extent inventories and receivables, affect the functioning of 
the collateral channel. In our next set of tests, we investigate whether there 
is a direct relationship between firms’ overall availability of debt finance 
and the strength of the collateral channel. For this purpose, we distinguish 
in our analysis between firms that are bank-dependent (firms with no bond 
rating and therefore no access to public debt markets) and those that are not 
(firms with a bond rating which allows issuing corporate bonds and/or 
commercial papers). The existence of a bond rating has been widely used as 
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a proxy of financial constraints, credit constraints and bank-dependence in 
the corporate finance and banking literature (e.g., Faulkender and Petersen, 
2006; Denis and Sibilkov, 2010; Chava and Purnanandam, 2011). Note that 
corporate bonds are typically unsecured, while bank loans and trade credit 
are often at least partially secured. Thus, we can take advantage of the 
information about firms’ bond ratings to identify whether their debt is likely 
to be unsecured (corporate bonds and commercial papers) or secured (bank 
loans and trade credit). The collateral channel should only be important for 
firms that are likely to depend on secured debt finance. Similar to 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) we find for our dataset that firms with a 
bond rating exhibit a significantly higher leverage than firms without a 
bond rating (means: 0.27 vs. 0.17, medians: 0.26 vs. 0.15; both differences 
are significant at the 1% level). Moreover, rated firms are bigger than 
unrated ones (means of log total assets: 5.55 vs. 6.98; the difference is 
significant at the 1%-level). To examine the impact of bank dependence we 
interact each of the three asset variables with the dummy variable “Rated” 
(which is one if the firm has a bond rating from S&P, and zero otherwise), 
as explained in equation 2.3. The coefficient of these three interaction terms 
indicates whether bank dependence affects the strength of the collateral 
channel. Table 2.5 reports the regression results.   
 This analysis yields clear results. The coefficients of all three 
interaction terms are negative. The effect of net PPE on leverage is 0.175 
for bank-dependent firms, but substantially reduced for firms that do not 
depend on banks (0.088 = 0.175 – 0.087). While inventories have no effect 
on leverage of bank-dependent firms, they do have a significantly negative 
effect on leverage of firms that do not depend on banks (-0.123 = 0.035 – 
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0.158). For receivables, we find a significant and positive effect for bank-
dependent firms, while the coefficient of the interaction term is negative but 
not significant. In unreported analysis, we split the sample in two categories 
and repeat our baseline regression (see equation 2.1). As expected, this 
approach yields identical findings as the analysis based on interaction 
terms. We interpret these results as evidence in favor of Hypothesis H3, 
which states that the collateral channel matters more for bank-dependent 
firms. 
  
 
52 
 
Table 2.5: Leverage, asset structure and bank-dependence 
This table reports results from regression analyses with leverage at time t as dependent 
variable and net property, plant and equipment (net PPE; alternatively gross PPE), 
inventories, and receivables measured at time t-1 as explanatory variables. We interact 
each of the asset variables with the indicator variable Rated, which equals one if a firm 
exhibits a bond rating from S&P in quarter t. We report the estimation results for cross-
sectional time-series pooled OLS regressions with industry fixed effects and time fixed 
effects. The analysis is based on 553 US firms for the period 1990-2010. ***, **, * 
indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level, using 
robust standard errors clustered within firms. A1 stands for the average absolute error term 
and A2 for the square root of the mean squared error term.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  OLS 
Dep. Var.: Leveraget Coeff. p-val 
Net PPEt-1 0.175 0.000*** 
Net PPEt-1*Rated -0.087 0.026** 
      
Inventoriest-1 0.035 0.484 
Inventoriest-1*Rated -0.158 0.019** 
      
Receivablest-1 0.165 0.011** 
Receivablest-1*Rated -0.087 0.294 
      
Rated 0.160 0.000*** 
      
Industry fixed effects Yes   
Year-quarter fixed effects Yes   
Obs. 41,420   
Adj. R
2 
A1 
0.270 
0.103 
  
  
A2 0.129   
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2.4.3 The collateral channel before and during the financial crisis 
 We now take a dynamic perspective on the interplay of firms’ bank 
dependence and the importance of the collateral channel. Specifically, we 
investigate whether and how the channel has changed during the global 
financial crisis and whether these changes differ between firms who depend 
on banks to raise external finance and those who do not depend on banks. 
For this purpose, we interact the variable “Subprime crisis” (equals one 
from August 2007 to August 2008, and zero otherwise) and “Post-Lehman 
crisis” (equals one from September 2008 to December 2010, and zero 
otherwise; the results are similar if the dummy switches already to zero 
again in January 2010), respectively, with the three asset variables and re-
estimate our model for rated and unrated firms separately, as proposed by 
Hypothesis H4. Table 2.6 presents the results. 
 We obtain two important results. First, Column (1) shows that the link 
between inventories (receivables) and leverage for unrated firms (=bank-
dependent firms) is significantly reduced during the subprime mortgage 
crisis period. The coefficients of the interaction terms for inventories and 
receivables are negative and significant at the 1%-level, resulting in a 
significantly negative overall effect for inventories and an insignificant 
effect for receivables. The coefficient of net PPE (0.18) has not 
significantly changed during the subprime crisis. For comparison, Column 
(2) shows that the collateral channel is weaker for rated firms and limited to 
net PPE as collateral, but there was no change during the subprime 
mortgage crisis period. Second, Column (3) reports again significantly 
negative interaction terms for the post-Lehman failure period for unrated 
firms. The main difference compared to Column (1) is that now the 
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influence of net PPE is substantially reduced. Even stronger effects are 
found for inventories and receivables. Interestingly, the findings for rated 
firms during the post-Lehman failure period are similar to those during the 
subprime mortgage crisis: we find a significantly positive effect of net PPE, 
but there is no change in the importance of the collateral channel when 
comparing the periods before and after the failure of Lehman Brothers. 
These results confirm that the collateral channel is more important for 
bank-dependent firms, as suggested by Hypothesis H3 and found in the 
previous section. However, we also find that the collateral channel at bank-
dependent firms was gradually weakened during the financial crisis. We 
observe that the importance of inventories and receivables at bank-
dependent firms declined during the subprime mortgage crisis (and 
continued to do so after the failure of Lehman Brothers), whereas the 
decline in importance of net property, plant and equipment only started 
after the failure of Lehman Brothers. In terms of magnitude, the total effect 
of net PPE at unrated and rated firms is similar in the post Lehman crisis 
period.  
 These results indicate that bank-dependent firms experienced a negative 
second-order shock during the financial crisis. This finding supports our 
Hypothesis H4. Next to the first order-effect that banks tightened their 
general lending standards and gradually reduced credit supply to the 
corporate sector, bank-dependent firms could not benefit to the same extent 
as in pre-crisis times from pledging redeployable assets as collateral to raise 
external finance.  
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2.4.4 Further empirical checks 
  
 We carried out further empirical checks to examine potential 
endogeneity problems, the goodness-of-fit of our main empirical models, 
the role of cash holdings, and potential effects of credit rating changes. 
 First, we conduct Granger causality tests to shed light on potential 
endogeneity problems (Granger, 1969). For this purpose, we estimate a 
two-equation vector autoregressive (VAR-1) model for leverage and net 
property, plant and equipment, which turned out to be most important for 
the collateral channel in previous analyses. In one specification we take the 
variable levels, and in the other we take the first differences of the 
variables. Table 2.7 presents the estimation results. 
 As shown in Models (1) and (2), we find that the coefficient of net PPE 
from time t-1 is positive and significantly related to leverage at time t, but 
leverage from time t-1 is not related to net PPE at time t. We obtain the 
same result for the analysis based on first differences. Again, the 
relationship goes from assets to leverage and not the other way round. 
These findings indicate that our previous results are robust to 
autocorrelation and not driven by endogeneity of leverage and assets. 
 Second, we investigate the goodness-of-fit of our empirical models in 
more detail. For this purpose, we consider two alternative approaches. 
Under the first approach we define decile dummies for the variables net 
PPE, Inventories and Receivables, respectively. We then estimate a 
regression model with 27 (= 30 – 3) dummy variables and the same controls 
and fixed effects as previously. The change of the R
2
 compared to the 
baseline model shown in Equation (2.1) indicates whether the specification 
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with decile dummy variables improves the goodness-of-fit. The latter 
would be the case if the relation between leverage and asset structure 
variables varies substantially in the decile subsamples. We find that the R
2 
never increases by more than 1.7 percentage points. In seven of the eight 
regression models (four models from Table 2.2 and four models from Table 
2.3) the absolute increase is smaller than 1 percentage point. Under the 
second approach we estimate our baseline model from Equation (2.1) on 
the 30 decile groups separately. The results again confirm that the R
2
 values 
vary in a reasonably close range across the deciles of each variable. 
 Third, we examine the relation between firms’ cash holdings and 
leverage. The pecking order theory predicts a strong negative relation that 
suggests that when firms need to invest they prefer using internal funding 
(cash) over external funding (debt and equity). We did not include cash in 
the previous analyses because it is strongly negatively correlated with the 
other assets variables, causing a severe multicollinearity problem. 
Subsequently, we estimate regression models with leverage at time t as 
dependent variable and cash holdings at time t-1, time fixed effects and 
industry fixed effects as explanatory variables. We further differentiate 
between rated and unrated firms and interact cash with the crisis indicator 
variables. Table 2.8 reports the results. 
 The analysis indicates, in line with theory, that there is a strongly 
negative relation between cash holdings and leverage. The coefficient of 
cash is -0.355 and significant at the 1%-level. The relation is more 
pronounced for rated firms (firms that are not bank-dependent) than for 
unrated firms (Model 2 vs. Model 3), and it becomes weaker for unrated 
(bank-dependent) firms during the subprime mortgage crisis (see Model 2). 
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There are no effects associated with the post-Lehman failure. The 
weakening of the cash-leverage relation for unrated (bank-dependent) firms 
during the subprime crisis can be explained by pre-cautionary hoarding of 
cash without reducing leverage. 
 Fourth, for the subsample of rated firms (19,537 firm-quarter 
observations) we investigate potential changes in the strength of the 
collateral channel around credit rating changes. This test is motivated by 
the study of Kisgen (2009) who shows that firms’ financing decisions are 
influenced by previous rating changes. We define the indicator variables 
“downgrade” (747 events) and “upgrade” (629 events) that equal one when 
a firm experiences a credit rating downgrade (upgrade) in quarter t. 
Alternatively, we create the variables “post downgrade” and “post 
upgrade”, which equal one in the fourth quarter after the quarter in which 
the rating change took place. We then interact these indicator variables with 
all three asset variables, respectively (net PPE, inventories and receivables). 
We do not find any effect for “downgrade” and “post downgrade” but we 
obtain a significantly positive coefficient for the interaction terms of the 
upgrade indicator variable with all three asset variables (+0.10 for net PPE, 
p-value=0.00; +0.10 for inventories, p-value=0.09; and +0.14 for 
receivables, p-val=0.05). We obtain similar coefficients for the interaction 
terms with “post upgrade” with net PPE and inventories. 
 
60 
 
                                          D
ep
. V
ar
.: 
L
ev
er
ag
e t
C
o
ef
f.
p
-v
al
C
o
ef
f.
p
-v
al
C
o
ef
f.
p
-v
al
C
o
ef
f.
p
-v
al
C
o
ef
f.
p
-v
al
C
as
h
t-
1
-0
.3
55
0.
00
0*
*
*
-0
.3
51
0.
00
0*
*
*
-0
.4
04
0.
00
0*
*
*
-0
.3
50
0.
00
0*
*
*
-0
.4
10
0.
00
0*
*
*
C
as
h
t-
1
*
R
at
ed
-0
.0
40
0.
45
6
C
as
h
t-
1
*
S
u
b
p
ri
m
e 
C
ri
si
s
0.
13
0
0.
02
5*
*
-0
.0
12
0.
87
7
C
as
h
t-
1
*
P
o
st
-L
eh
m
an
 C
ri
si
s
0.
05
3
0.
29
8
0.
07
0
0.
44
1
R
at
ed
0.
07
6
0.
00
0*
*
*
S
u
b
p
ri
m
e 
C
ri
si
s
-0
.0
31
0.
00
0*
*
*
-0
.0
11
0.
20
9
P
o
st
-L
eh
m
an
 C
ri
si
s
 
0.
02
0
0.
38
0
0.
04
9
0.
02
5*
*
In
d
u
st
ry
 f
ix
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
Y
ea
r-
q
u
ar
te
r 
fi
xe
d
 e
ff
ec
ts
O
b
s.
A
d
j. 
R
2
A
1
A
2
0.
09
3
0.
11
9
0.
09
4
0.
11
9
23
,7
60
0.
29
3
0.
09
8
0.
12
5
0.
09
7
0.
12
3
23
,7
60
0.
29
4
0.
09
8
0.
12
5
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
42
,3
64
0.
34
1
18
,6
04
0.
21
5
18
,6
04
0.
21
6
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
A
ll 
fi
rm
s
U
n
ra
te
d
 f
ir
m
s
R
at
ed
 f
ir
m
s
U
n
ra
te
d
 f
ir
m
s
R
at
ed
 f
ir
m
s
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
O
L
S
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
G
en
er
al
 E
ff
ec
t
Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
th
e 
su
b
p
ri
m
e 
m
o
rt
g
ag
e 
cr
is
is
Im
p
ac
t 
o
f 
th
e 
p
o
st
-L
eh
m
an
 c
ri
si
s
T
a
b
le
 2
.8
: 
L
ev
er
a
g
e 
a
n
d
 c
a
sh
 h
o
ld
in
g
s 
T
h
is
 t
ab
le
 r
ep
o
rt
s 
re
su
lt
s 
fr
o
m
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
 a
n
al
y
se
s 
w
it
h
 l
ev
er
ag
e 
at
 t
im
e 
t 
as
 d
ep
en
d
en
t 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 a
n
d
 c
as
h
 (
o
v
er
 t
o
ta
l 
as
se
ts
) 
m
ea
su
re
d
 a
t 
ti
m
e 
t-
1
 a
s 
ex
p
la
n
at
o
ry
 v
ar
ia
b
le
. 
W
e 
in
te
ra
ct
 t
h
e 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 c
as
h
 w
it
h
 t
h
e 
in
d
ic
at
o
r 
v
ar
ia
b
le
 “
S
u
b
p
ri
m
e 
C
ri
si
s”
 (
“P
o
st
-L
eh
m
an
 C
ri
si
s”
),
 w
h
ic
h
 e
q
u
al
s 
o
n
e 
fr
o
m
 2
0
0
7
Q
3
 t
o
 2
0
0
9
Q
2
 (
fr
o
m
 2
0
0
8
Q
4
 t
o
 2
0
1
0
Q
4
) 
an
d
 s
h
o
w
 t
h
e 
re
su
lt
s 
al
l 
fi
rm
s,
 u
n
ra
te
d
 f
ir
m
s 
an
d
 r
at
ed
 f
ir
m
s.
 W
e 
re
p
o
rt
 t
h
e 
es
ti
m
at
io
n
 r
es
u
lt
s 
fo
r 
cr
o
ss
-s
ec
ti
o
n
al
 t
im
e-
se
ri
es
 p
o
o
le
d
 
O
L
S
 r
eg
re
ss
io
n
s 
w
it
h
 i
n
d
u
st
ry
 a
n
d
 t
im
e 
fi
x
ed
 e
ff
ec
ts
. 
T
h
e 
an
al
y
si
s 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n
 5
5
3
 U
S
 f
ir
m
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
p
er
io
d
 1
9
9
0
-2
0
1
0
. 
*
*
*
, 
*
*
, 
*
 i
n
d
ic
at
e 
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
 t
h
at
 a
re
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
al
ly
 s
ig
n
if
ic
an
t 
at
 t
h
e 
1
%
, 
5
%
, 
an
d
 1
0
%
-l
ev
el
, 
u
si
n
g
 r
o
b
u
st
 s
ta
n
d
ar
d
 e
rr
o
rs
 
cl
u
st
er
ed
 w
it
h
in
 f
ir
m
s.
 A
1
 s
ta
n
d
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
av
er
ag
e 
ab
so
lu
te
 e
rr
o
r 
te
rm
 a
n
d
 A
2
 f
o
r 
th
e 
sq
u
ar
e 
ro
o
t 
o
f 
th
e 
m
ea
n
 s
q
u
ar
ed
 e
rr
o
r 
te
rm
. 
 
 
61 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 Our study provides new evidence on the cross-sectional and time-
varying importance of the collateral channel for corporate leverage. We 
study the link between corporate asset structure and leverage, the link 
between asset and debt maturity, the influence of limited access to external 
finance, and the impact of the global financial crisis. Our analysis is based 
on a large quarterly panel dataset of US firms from 1990 to 2010. 
 We find that redeployable assets, especially property, plant and 
equipment, are of key importance for the collateral channel, while 
inventories and receivables matter to a lesser extent. The collateral channel 
is more important for firms that depend on private debt compared to firms 
that have the choice between issuing public or private debt. Finally, we 
document that the collateral channel has become weaker for bank-
dependent firms after the start of the financial crisis, while there is no such 
effect for other firms. 
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Chapter 3      
Substitution effects in SME Finance4 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Financing small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) is challenging 
because these firms are more informationally opaque, risky, financially 
constrained, and bank-dependent than large firms. SMEs mainly rely on 
bank credit and trade credit from suppliers to raise external finance (e.g., 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). They generally prefer 
bank credit over trade credit because the former tends to be less expensive 
and more flexible than the latter. But, how do SMEs respond when banks 
cut their lending? Is trade credit the appropriate response? Are there 
substitution effects between bank credit and trade credit? In this study, we 
investigate whether SMEs that have demand for debt finance increase trade 
credit (accounts payable) after a supply-side driven shock to their bank 
credit and which factors influence their response. We base the analysis on a 
large sample of SMEs from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K. and 
a subsample with matched bank-firm data.    
 The topic of our study is relevant for several reasons. First, SMEs 
                                                          
4
 This chapter is based on a working paper by Norden, Van Kampen and Illueca Muñoz 
(2017). For this chapter I would like to thank Alexander Borisov, Jefferson Colombo, 
Karolin Kirschenmann, Manuel Illueca Muñoz, Lars Norden, Andrea Presbireto, Peter 
Roosenboom, Greg Udell, Cynthia van Hulle, Wolf Wagner, participants of the 5
th
 MoFiR 
Workshop on Banking in Chicago, the 13
th
 Corporate Finance Day in Ghent, the 16
th
 
Annual Meeting of the Brazilian Finance Association in Rio de Janeiro, the Reserve Bank 
of Australia’s Conference on Small Business Conditions and Finance in Sydney, the 21st 
Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association in Karlsruhe, the 1
st
 Benelux Banking 
Research Day in Amsterdam and the ERIM PhD Seminar in Finance and Accounting at the 
Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and several anonymous referees. 
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represent a large fraction of all firms in many countries and contribute 
significantly to employment and growth. However, little is known about the 
dynamic interplay of bank credit and trade credit at individual SMEs. 
Second, variation in the availability of private debt can amplify or weaken 
the business cycle (e.g., King and Levine, 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 
2000). If firms counter a negative shock to their bank credit by employing 
trade credit, they stabilize their access to credit throughout the cycle. 
However, if bank credit and trade credit are complementary (i.e., they 
increase or decrease at the same time), then booms and recessions are 
amplified, resulting in more volatile economic activity over time. 
Therefore, the question of whether the components of SMEs private debt 
finance are complements or substitutes are of first order importance. Third, 
if employing trade credit is not a sufficient response to a negative shock to 
bank credit supply, then policymakers should focus on stabilizing bank 
credit supply and improving the bank lending environment in the first 
place, not consider trade credit as alternative to bank credit. SMEs can also 
stabilize bank credit supply at the micro level by combining forward and 
spot lending, different loan types and loans from institutions with different 
lending policies. 
 Researchers are examining the importance of trade credit provision 
(accounts receivable) and SMEs’ use of trade credit (accounts payable) in 
different contexts, such as the effects of the recent financial crisis, trade 
credit chains, cost of capital, and economic growth (e.g., Garcia-Appendini 
and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Murfin and Njoroge, 2014; Jacobson and von 
Schedvin, 2015; Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2016). 
The evidence is rather mixed. On the one hand, Carbo-Valverde et al. 
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(2016) show that unconstrained firms in Spain mainly fund their 
investments with bank finance, while strongly constrained firms fund their 
investments with trade credit and this dependency increased during the 
recent financial crisis. Hence, trade credit can play a positive role because it 
helps to mitigate the adverse effects of a contraction of bank credit supply. 
On the other hand, Jacobson and von Schedvin (2015) analyze data from 
the Swedish credit bureau and highlight a negative role of trade credit. They 
document strong negative propagation effects in trade credit chains, arising 
from direct credit losses, negative credit quality spillover, and the loss of 
future business for suppliers. 
 Biais and Gollier (1997) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) suggest that 
there is a substitution relation between bank credit and trade credit. 
Substitution may occur because trade credit represents external finance for 
firms that are unable to attract sufficient bank credit because of severe 
informational asymmetries. The substitution hypothesis coincides with the 
redistribution view on trade credit (e.g., Love, Preve and Sarria-Allende, 
2007). Financially unconstrained firms redistribute part of their bank credit 
to financially constrained client firms by providing trade credit (e.g., 
Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga, 2013).  
 However, there are also arguments and evidence against a substitution 
relation between bank credit and trade credit. Bank credit creates a cash 
inflow that can be used for any purpose, while trade credit corresponds to a 
delayed payment for inputs for the production process. This fundamental 
difference might limit the possibility that these two forms of credit serve as 
substitutes for one another. Breza and Liberman (2017) find that trade 
credit does not create a special financing advantage but rather serves as 
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mechanism to overcome contracting frictions between customers and 
suppliers. Murfin and Njoroge (2014) show the implicit costs of trade credit 
that have been neglected in earlier research. They focus on the retail 
industry and show that large, financially unconstrained buyers employ their 
bargaining power vis-à-vis small, financially constrained suppliers to obtain 
better terms in trade credit. Cuñat (2007) develops a model of trade credit 
and tests its predictions on a sample of firms from the U.K. He finds that 
trade credit insures firms against liquidity shocks and that it is mainly used 
when other forms of finance have been exhausted. These results are more 
pronounced when the links between supplier and customer are tight and the 
production process very specific. Fabbri and Menichini (2010) find that 
when the purchased goods are sufficiently liquid trade credit does not 
depend on the degree of financial constraints of the customer. The findings 
of these studies imply that trade credit is not a mere substitute for bank 
credit.  
 To identify a causal relation between a negative shock to SMEs’ bank 
credit and their potential response in trade credit we apply a twofold 
strategy. First, we consider SMEs that have demand for external finance but 
experience a negative shock to bank credit supply. In this way, we study 
whether firms can substitute since we rule out the situation that firms do not 
want to substitute because they have sufficient alternative funding sources 
available. Our setting allows us to interpret the negative complementary 
relation between bank credit and trade credit as evidence for firms’ inability 
to substitute because we focus on external finance-dependent firms that 
have demand for external finance (Becker and Ivashina, 2014). Following 
the rationale of Rajan and Zingales (1998), we classify firm-year 
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observations as external finance dependent if the cash flows are insufficient 
to cover the firm’s investments. We measure the probability of substitution 
(firms exhibit an increase in trade credit after a negative shock to their bank 
credit) relative to a negative complementary relation (firms exhibit a 
decrease of trade credit and bank credit) with a novel firm-specific time-
varying substitution indicator and study the factors that influence this 
probability. We base our analysis on a large dataset on SMEs from France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom during 2006-2011. Second, 
we carry out an additional analysis with rich matched bank-firm data from 
Spain that allows us to establish a causal effect between the negative shock 
to SMEs’ bank credit during the recent financial crisis and SMEs’ ability to 
replace the funding gap with trade credit. 
 We obtain the following principal results. First, we find that substitution 
is more likely the higher the credit quality of the firm. Second, substitution 
decreased during the financial crisis of 2007-09 and further declined as the 
crisis deepened. Third, the impact of credit quality on the probability of 
substitution exhibits an inverse U-shaped relation with financial constraints. 
It is less important for the firms with low or no financial constraints 
because they are more likely to attract alternative forms of finance. It is also 
less important for the firms with high financial constraints because they are 
likely credit-rationed and therefore cannot borrow anyway. We confirm 
these results in a subsample analysis with matched bank-firm data from 
Spain.          
 Overall, the evidence suggests that trade credit is not the appropriate 
response to fill the funding gap of SMEs when banks cut their lending. 
Firms with a lower credit quality have more difficulty to replace bank credit 
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with trade credit, which contradicts the substitution hypothesis and the 
redistribution view. The probability of substitution decreased significantly 
when the recent financial crisis deepened. The substitution relation between 
bank credit and trade credit is time-varying and ultimately pro-cyclical, 
potentially amplifying the effect of recessions. 
 Our paper contributes to the SME finance literature in several ways. 
First, the substitution indicator makes it possible for us to examine the 
cross-sectional and time variation and allows us in combination with the 
other elements of our investigation (negative shock to bank credit and 
SMEs’ external finance dependence), to identify a causal effect. 
 Second, we fill an important gap left by the study of Garcia-Appendini 
and Montoriol-Garriga (2013). We investigate SMEs’ use of trade credit 
(accounts payable), whereas Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga 
(2013) focus on relatively large U.S. firms from Compustat and investigate 
their provision of trade credit (accounts receivable). Because SMEs cannot 
access public debt markets, their external finance is largely limited to bank 
credit and trade credit. Thus, SMEs are the ideal testing ground to study 
substitution effects in private debt. 
 Third, we use data from the five biggest EU countries. Considering 
cross-country data is important because the firm characteristics, financial 
systems, and legal environments differ and affect the supply and demand 
for different types of debt (e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2004; Berger and Udell, 2006; Haselmann, Pistor 
and Vig, 2010). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we 
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present the related literature and develop our hypotheses. In Section 3.3, we 
describe the data and show summary statistics. In Section 3.4, we report the 
main results. In Section 3.5, we report additional analyses based on 
matched-bank firm data. We conclude in Section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
The literature has proposed several supply- and demand-side rationales as 
to why trade credit is a pervasive component on the firm’s balance sheet. 
According to supply-side rationales, trade credit helps a firm to: (1) acquire 
private information about the customer (e.g., Smith, 1989; Mian and Smith, 
1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1997); (2) enhance strong bargaining positions 
with customers (e.g., Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen, 2011; Cuñat, 2007); 
(3) decrease warehouse costs (Emery, 1987); and (4) facilitate a long-term 
supplier-customer relationship leading to future business opportunities (Ng, 
Smith and Smith, 1999).  
 The most important demand-side rationale for trade credit is that many 
firms, and in particular SMEs, resort to trade credit for financing because 
they are financially constrained and thus have limited or no access to other 
forms of external funding (e.g., Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and 
Rajan, 1997). This rationale implies that bank credit and trade credit are 
substitutes for one another because these firms attract trade credit if they 
cannot secure bank credit. This interchangeability coincides with the 
redistribution view on trade credit (e.g., Love et al., 2007). The 
redistribution view implies that companies that borrow from financial 
intermediaries redistribute partly their borrowings to those who do not have 
access to financial intermediaries. The study of Garcia-Appendini and 
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Montoriol-Garriga (2013) examines the provision of trade credit among 
large listed U.S. firms during 2005-2010 and confirms this mechanism. 
 Researchers further show that macroeconomic conditions have a 
significant influence on credit relationships (e.g., Petersen and Rajan, 1994; 
Berger and Udell, 2002; Nilsen, 2002; Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
Access to credit deteriorates during recessions because creditors become 
more risk averse and therefore restrict credit extensions (Gertler and 
Gilchrist, 1994), implying that the relation between bank credit and trade 
credit varies with the state of the economy. A financial crisis will trigger 
liquidity shocks for certain firms, which will make them less creditworthy, 
thereby reducing their access to bank credit. This can lead to two opposite 
scenarios. The good scenario follows the substitution theory. In this case, 
firms experiencing credit constraints due to liquidity shocks will be able to 
secure more trade credit. The bad scenario holds that bank credit and trade 
credit exhibit a complementary relation. In this scenario, firms facing 
liquidity shocks will see their access to bank credit decline, along with their 
access to trade credit due to risk related to credit contagion (e.g., Jorion and 
Zhang, 2009). Deutsche Bundesbank (2012) and Kestens, Van 
Cauwenberge and Van Der Bauwhede (2012) document that trade credit 
extension decreased progressively during the recent financial crisis. 
 The common view in the earlier literature has been that trade credit 
(accounts payable) and short-term bank credit are substitutes for one 
another. However, there are arguments and evidence that challenge this 
view: (1) Firms cannot use trade credit in the same way as they can use 
bank credit. Trade credit does not create a cash inflow; it results from a 
delayed cash outflow for a specific purpose. In contrast, bank credit creates 
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a cash inflow that can be used for any purpose. Hence, firms can use bank 
credit in a more flexible way than trade credit. (2) In many studies on trade 
credit, its interplay with short-term bank credit is not considered, nor is the 
potential endogeneity between trade credit and bank credit addressed. 
Uesugi and Yamashiro (2008) and Yang (2011) estimate the determinants 
of bank credit and trade credit in simultaneous equation models. The 
evidence provided by these studies casts doubt on the substitution 
hypothesis. (3) The common view that trade credit is less preferred than 
bank credit because of its higher price has been questioned in the recent 
literature. Giannetti et al. (2011) find that creditworthy firms with some 
bargaining power in the market do obtain trade credit at a low cost. Fabbri 
and Menichini (2010) find that trade credit becomes cheaper than bank 
credit if the liquidation value of the purchased goods is relatively high. 
Relatedly, the redistribution view of trade credit implies that customers are 
weaker and more dependent than their suppliers. However, large customers 
usually have a significant bargaining power vis-a-vis smaller suppliers, 
indicating that suppliers can also be highly dependent on their customers 
(e.g., Giannetti et al., 2011; Albuquerque, Ramadorai and Watugala, 2015). 
(4) Many studies are based on single country data (e.g., Jacobson and von 
Schedvin, 2015; Boissay and Gropp, 2013; Kestens et al., 2012; Yang, 
2011; Cuñat, 2007; Biais and Gollier, 1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). 
Haselmann et al. (2010) show that differences in the legal environment 
across countries influence credit markets. (5) Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
find that both the most and least profitable firms strongly use trade credit. 
(6) Fisman and Love (2003) find it is difficult for young firms to obtain 
trade credit. The substitution hypothesis implies that these firms cannot 
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borrow from banks and therefore have to rely on trade credit.   
   
 We derive a set of hypotheses on the determinants of the interplay 
between bank credit and trade credit (accounts payable). We note that the 
determinants of the probability of substitution between trade credit and 
short-term bank credit have not been directly examined in any of the related 
studies (e.g., Jacobson and von Schedvin, 2015; Carbo-Valverde, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell, 2016; Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga, 2013). 
 There are several firm characteristics that could affect the probability of 
substitution between bank credit and trade credit. We argue that credit 
quality is the most important factor to influence the probability of 
substitution. It should explain most of the cross-sectional and time variation 
in individual firms’ substitution behavior. We expect credit quality to have 
a positive impact on the probability of substitution because the higher the 
credit quality, the lower the default risk for the supplier and, as a result, the 
more likely that suppliers are willing to provide trade credit. This 
expectation is not trivial because trade credit is fully secured debt, implying 
that suppliers might be indifferent about the credit quality of their customer. 
In our analysis, we consider the reaction of firms in trade credit that 
experience a decrease in bank credit. We state Hypothesis 1 as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 1: Credit quality has a positive impact on the probability of 
substitution between bank credit and trade credit. 
 Furthermore, we consider the time-series variation of the interplay 
between trade credit and bank credit. Earlier studies show that a financial 
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crisis leads to a decrease in bank lending because banks are concerned 
about their liquidity and solvency (e.g., Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). 
Banks contract their credit supply in poor economic periods, resulting in an 
overall increase of financial constraints for firms. Highly constrained firms 
and firms with low credit quality might be the most affected by this 
mechanism. Yang (2011) shows that substituting bank credit for trade credit 
becomes more difficult during times of crisis due to credit contagion. 
 The impact that a financial crisis has on the interplay of bank credit and 
trade credit could vary during the different stages of the crisis. In the first 
stage of the recent financial crisis (i.e., the subprime mortgage crisis), banks 
had to build up capital that was eliminated by unprecedented losses. As a 
result, banks had to reduce lending, leading to a negative credit supply 
shock, as shown by Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). After the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers (the second stage), the financial crisis evolved into a deep 
global recession, and bank lending problems got significantly worse. We 
state Hypothesis 2 as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 2: The probability of substitution between bank credit and 
trade credit decreased during the first stage of the recent financial crisis 
(H2a) and decreased more strongly during the second stage of the financial 
crisis (H2b). 
 
 Moreover, the impact of the firm’s credit quality on the probability of 
substitution might interact with the firm’s level of financial constraints. 
Firms that are either unconstrained or highly constrained are less likely to 
substitute sources of credit. We note that financial constraints and credit 
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quality are related to each other, but not the same (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard 
and Petersen, 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Firms that are financially 
constrained have difficulties in acquiring external finance because they are 
more opaque. Due to this opaqueness they have difficulties in signaling 
their true credit quality, which results in higher costs of debt. Therefore, the 
impact of the credit quality on the probability of substitution should be 
lower for unconstrained firms and for highly constrained firms. The first 
group is unlikely to substitute because they have access to alternative forms 
of external finance, while the second group is credit-rationed. The latter 
firms do not get any credit; lenders ignore differences in the risk of default 
of these firms. However, high credit quality firms with intermediate 
financial constraints might be able to substitute. Our hypothesis is partially 
supported by Atanasova (2007) who finds that financially constrained firms 
are more likely to resort to trade credit, while unconstrained firms avoid 
trade credit. A potential non-monotonic effect is not considered in that 
study. We state Hypothesis 3 as follows: 
 
 Hypothesis 3: Credit quality and financial constraints have a significant 
and non-monotonic interaction effect on the probability of substitution 
between bank credit and trade credit. 
 
3.3 Data and Empirical Method   
3.3.1 Data source and selection criteria  
 We collect firm data from the Orbis and SABI databases, both provided 
by Bureau van Dijk. These databases contain firm-year observations from 
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the five biggest countries in the EU (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom). Data for Spain comes from the SABI database, while the 
data from the other four countries are gathered from Orbis. We restrict our 
analysis to non-financial firms that are not publicly listed and that exhibit 
total assets not larger than €43 million in the last available year, consistent 
with the definition of SMEs from the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2005). Moreover, in Orbis there are many data points that 
report values of zero, potentially having an ambiguous meaning; they can 
either mean zero, “missing,” or “unknown.” To prevent this ambiguity in 
our dataset, we only include firms where the value of accounts payable, 
accounts receivable, and short-term bank credit equals at least €1,000 in 
any of the years in our sample period.  
 Applying these selection criteria results in our dataset with yearly data 
from 2006 to 2011 (2006 to 2010 for Spain). Since we use financial 
statement information we do not know the identity and number of firms’ 
suppliers and banks. Nevertheless, we use a matched bank-firm dataset for 
Spain in an additional analysis.  
 In Orbis, the number of firms included in the database differs for each 
country, which results in certain countries being heavily over- or 
underrepresented in the raw dataset. Therefore, we construct the dataset in a 
way that gives each country a weight that is proportional to its average 
GDP over the sample period. The final dataset is comprised of 1,186 SMEs 
from Germany (28%), 922 from France (22%), 920 from the U.K. (21%), 
751 from Italy (17%), and 501 from Spain (12%). In that sample, we 
include the largest SMEs from each country. To rule out that our results are 
driven by a selection bias, we also stratify the raw sample in size quintiles 
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and randomly draw a number of firms (equal to the number of firms for 
each country in the main dataset divided by five) within each country-
quintile and repeat this procedure 100 times. 
3.3.2 Empirical strategy 
 A major challenge in studying the relation between bank credit and 
trade credit at the firm level is that both variables may change 
simultaneously. The resulting potential endogeneity has not been addressed 
in many studies (e.g., Kestens et al., 2012; Nilsen, 2002) because they 
either regress trade credit on bank credit (or the other way around) or do not 
control for bank credit, making it difficult to draw conclusions about the 
complementary or substitution relation between trade credit and bank 
credit. 
 We focus on the probability of substitution between the components of 
SMEs’ private debt and its determinants, while earlier studies examine the 
determinants of trade credit or bank credit (e.g., Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The substitution 
indicator (SIit) equals zero for a negative complementary relation between 
changes in bank credit (ΔBit-1) and changes in trade credit (ΔTit), and one 
for a substitution relation between changes in bank credit and changes in 
trade credit, both conditional on a negative shock to short-term bank credit 
in the previous year. It is defined as shown in Equation (3.1)
5
. In this 
specification we define trade credit as the accounts payable. 
 
                                                          
5
 In a robustness test we consider a modified substitution indicator that takes also 
contemporaneous shocks to bank credit into account (Section 3.4.5 and Table 3.9). 
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                        0 if ΔBit-1<0 ∩ ΔTit<0  
 SIit =        (3.1) 
   1 if ΔBit-1<0 ∩ ΔTit>0 
 
 Our identification strategy is twofold. First, we focus on firms that have 
demand for external finance to ensure that they want to substitute bank 
credit for trade credit. To identify firms with demand for credit, we use the 
concept of external finance dependence proposed by Rajan and Zingales 
(1998). Firms that have no demand for external finance do not need to 
substitute bank credit because they have sufficient internal finance to fund 
their operations (Becker and Ivashina, 2014; Duchin et al., 2010). External 
finance dependence is calculated as formulated in Equation (3.2): 
 
                      𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑖𝑡 =
∆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
∆𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
               (3.2)           
     
∆TAit is a proxy for a firm’s yearly level of investments and CFit represents 
the firm’s annual cash flows. Only observations with a positive outcome are 
included in the analyses because these are the firms that theoretically need 
credit.
6
 We calculate EFDit at the firm level and, alternatively, at the 
industry-country level. For the latter, we use the median values of ∆TAit and 
CFit at the industry-country level. On the one hand, EFDit at the firm level 
is more informative about a firm’s specific needs for external finance than 
EFDit at the country-industry level. On the other hand, the level of 
                                                          
6
 Alternatively, we computed EFD only for observations with ∆TA>0 because EFD 
becomes positive for ∆TA<0 and CF>0. The results are similar. 
78 
 
investments depends on a firm’s access to finance, making EFDit potentially 
endogenous at the firm level, but not at the country-industry level. Because 
of these reasons we decided to consider both measures of EFDit.  
 We note that our sample period of 2006-2011 includes a severe 
macroeconomic recession, during which many banks had to reduce their 
lending significantly because of large losses, illiquidity, and insolvency 
concerns (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Puri, 
Rocholl and Steffen, 2011). Therefore, we study the response of trade credit 
after a negative shock to SMEs’ bank credit, which is for the vast majority 
of SMEs an exogenous and credit supply-side driven shock.  
 Second, we conduct an additional analysis with rich matched bank-firm 
on Spain that allows a direct identification of firms that were facing a 
negative shock to bank credit during our sample period. We distinguish 
between SMEs that have a relationship with an unhealthy bank (measured 
by the incidence of being bailed out by the government) and firms that do 
not have a relationship with an unhealthy bank. SMEs that borrow from 
unhealthy banks were facing a stronger reduction in credit supply and 
therefore had a higher need for substitution during the recent financial 
crisis. We examine whether trade credit helped these firms to replace the 
funding gap. 
3.3.3 Variables and descriptive statistics 
 Our dependent variable is the substitution indicator SIit, as explained 
above. Figure 3.1 shows the relative frequency of substitution (SIit=1) by 
country and over time. There is a sharp decrease in the fractions of 
substitution relations throughout the financial crisis until 2009, as well as 
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an increase during the recovery in 2010. All five countries show a similar 
pattern but the effects vary in terms of their magnitude. The mean of SI in 
the entire sample equals to 0.49, indicating that substitution and 
complementary relationships are on average almost equally likely to occur. 
However, the overall mean value clouds that there is substantial variation 
over time (e.g., the yearly mean of SI in the U.K. changes from 0.28 in 
2008 to 0.65 in 2010) that indicates that the probability of substitution 
depends on the state of the economy. 
 
Figure 3.1: Substitution Indicator over time 
 
 The explanatory variables are the potential factors that might influence 
the substitution indicator as posited in Hypotheses 1-3. The main 
explanatory variable is the credit quality of the firm, which we measure 
with the Altman Z-score (Z) for private firms (Altman, 1968). The Z-score 
is a widely used composite measure of credit quality (firm default risk) and 
is based on several factors, such as liquidity, retained earnings, profitability, 
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leverage, sales, and size. Agarwal and Taffler (2007) show that the Z-score 
is predictive of the default risk of firms in different time periods and 
different countries. Altman’s Z-score7 for private companies is computed as 
shown in Equation (3.3). All components are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 
percentile to ensure that the Z-score is not driven by extreme observations. 
 
𝑍𝑖𝑡 =  0.7
𝑊𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 0.85
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 3.1
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
+ 0.4
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡
+
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
    (3.3)          
     
  As stated in Hypothesis 3, the influence of Altman’s Z-score on the 
probability of substitution might be dependent on the level of financial 
constraints of the firm. We measure financial constraints with a widely used 
measure, the KZ index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Lamont, Polk, Saá-
Requejo, 2001), which is defined in Equation (3.4).
8
 All components are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. In order to measure the non-
monotonicity between the Z-score and the KZ index, we create quintile 
dummies for the latter (KZ_Q). 
 
𝐾𝑍𝑖𝑡 = −1.002
𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 3.139
𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
+ 39.368
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
− 1.315
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡−1
   (3.4)          
       Because there has been debate about how to measure financial 
constraints (e.g., Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist, 2016), we consider the WW 
index (Whited and Wu, 2006) and the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 2010) 
                                                          
7
 Sales are not available for firms from the U.K. We therefore use operating revenues in all 
countries. For EBIT, we take ROA before taxes instead. Retained earnings are not directly 
available in Orbis. We have estimated them as equity minus capital (firm wealth minus the 
value of the shares). 
8
 Dividends are not available in Orbis. We estimate dividends as net income minus the 
change in equity (i.e., the proportion of income that is not retained by the company). 
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as alternative measures in robustness tests.   
 Moreover, we examine the impact of the recent financial crisis, using a 
set of dummy variables that indicate different stages of the crisis. In 
continental Europe, the first (second) stage of the crisis, D_Crisis1 
(D_Crisis2), is a dummy variable equal to one in the year 2008 (2009), and 
zero otherwise. We consider 2009 as the second stage of the crisis because 
Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, which is the trigger event 
of the deep global recession. In the U.K., we consider 2007 (2008) as the 
first (second) stage of the crisis because the crisis started earlier and 
evolved faster in the U.K. due to its stronger ties with the U.S. The post-
crisis period is indicated by a dummy variable (D_Aftermath) that equals 
one in the years 2010-2011 (2009-2011 for the U.K.) and zero otherwise. 
 We add several control variables that might influence the substitution 
indicator. The first variable is firm size (LnTA), measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets. The second variable is collateral, motived by the 
study of Cuñat (2007), and measured in two ways. Long-term collateral is 
measured with fixed tangible assets (TangFA) and short-term collateral 
with inventories (Inv) (e.g., Norden and van Kampen, 2013), both scaled by 
total assets. The third variable is the sum of cash and cash equivalents 
divided by total assets (Cash). The last variable is profitability measured by 
ROA. In all regressions, we control for industry and country fixed effects, 
where industry is derived from the two digit SIC code. Industry fixed 
effects are important because suppliers are more willing two extend trade 
credit to customers in industries with high product specificity (Cuñat, 
2007). Country fixed effects are important because heterogeneity in 
financial and legal systems creates heterogeneity in financial markets (e.g., 
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La Porta et al., 1997; Haselmann et al., 2010). Z and ROA are highly 
sensitive to outliers and are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile at the 
country level.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for all non-indicator variables. We present the 
number of firm years for each variable and the mean, median, and standard deviation for 
both outcomes of SIit. Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for all firms that were 
facing a negative shock to bank credit in year t-1, while Panel B presents the descriptive 
statistics only for the firms that are externally finance-dependent (hereinafter: EFD firms; 
the increase in total assets exceeds the value of operating cash flows, as is proposed by 
Rajan and Zingales 1998). 
 
Panel A: All firms 
  Firm-Years Mean   Median   St. Dev. 
    (0) (1)   (0) (1)   (0) (1) 
Z 9,222 2.72 2.89   2.58 2.71   1.36 1.47 
KZ 8,808 -0.24 -0.12   0.01 0.29   3.45 3.33 
KZ_Q 8,808 2.85 3.03   3.00 3.00   1.40 1.42 
Size 9,672 9.63 9.44   10.14 9.98   1.22 1.25 
Cash 9,434 0.08 0.08   0.03 0.03   0.12 0.11 
Inventories 9,570 0.20 0.20   0.14 0.14   0.22 0.21 
Tangibles 9,618 0.27 0.28   0.20 0.20   0.26 0.26 
ROA 9,392 0.03 0.03   0.02 0.02   0.08 0.08 
 
Panel B: External finance-dependent firms (EFD firms) 
  Firm-Years Mean   Median   St. Dev. 
    (0) (1)   (0) (1)   (0) (1) 
Z 7,365 2.65 2.86   2.49 2.66   1.35 1.50 
KZ 7,011 -0.22 0.09   0.06 0.45   3.49 3.33 
KZ_Q 7,011 2.88 3.13   3.00 3.00   1.41 1.42 
Size 7,746 9.68 9.42   10.19 9.98   1.24 1.29 
Cash 7,561 0.07 0.07   0.03 0.03   0.11 0.11 
Inventories 7,663 0.21 0.22   0.15 0.15   0.22 0.22 
Tangibles 7,693 0.27 0.26   0.19 0.18   0.26 0.26 
ROA 7,479 0.02 0.03   0.02 0.02   0.07 0.07 
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 The summary statistics in Table 3.1 are reported separately for the firms 
that exhibit a complementary relation (column (0)) and those that exhibit a 
substitution relation (column (1)). Panel A reports the descriptive statistics 
for all firms experiencing a negative shock in bank credit, while Panel B 
reports the statistics for the firms that have demand for external finance 
(EFD firms). The mean and median values of the Z-score are higher for the 
substitution firms, indicating that firms of higher credit quality substitute 
credit more often. The mean and median of the Z-score differ substantially 
across countries (not reported); German firms have the highest credit 
quality with a mean (median) Z-score of 3.36 (3.13), while Italian firms 
have the lowest credit quality with a mean (median) Z-score of 1.78 (1.68). 
The other three countries have Z-scores between 2 and 3. In addition, the 
value for Z (KZ) drops (rises) when we exclude firms that have no demand 
for external finance. This is intuitive because firms that do not need 
external finance display usually a higher credit quality and lower financial 
constraints.  
 
3.4 Empirical Analysis   
3.4.1 Baseline Analysis  
 First, we investigate which factors influence whether SMEs increase 
trade credit after they have experienced a negative shock to their bank 
credit by regressing the SIit on the lagged Z-score, the crisis dummies, and 
lags of the control variables. Table 3.2 presents our baseline results.  
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 We find that the credit quality measure Zit-1 has a consistently positive 
impact on the probability of substitution. As shown in Table 3.2, a one-unit 
increase in Zit-1 is associated with a 7.8% increase in the probability of 
substitution. The result indicates that credit substitution for low credit 
quality SMEs is difficult because suppliers care about the ex ante default 
risk of their customers although trade credit is fully secured debt. 
Moreover, the probability of substitution went down significantly during 
the crisis: it is 28.1% lower during the first stage of the financial crisis and 
52.0% during the second stage compared to the pre-crisis level, 
respectively. These findings remain similar if we add control variables in 
column (2) and become even stronger if we only consider firms that have 
demand for external finance in column (3). We note that the sample size 
decreases only slightly when we exclude firms that do not depend on 
external finance (from 8,825 to 7,040). This is not surprising because SMEs 
are in general strongly dependent on external finance. In column (3), a one-
unit increase in Zit-1 is associated with a 9.9% increase in the probability of 
substitution. We thus conclude that, all else being equal, the relation 
between credit quality and substitution is monotonic. In column (4), we 
present the results of a regression when the variables are demeaned at the 
country-level median and obtain similar results. In column (5) we report the 
results for firms located in external finance-dependent industries. A one 
unit increase in Altman’s Z increases the probability of substitution with 
6.7%, the result becomes weakly significant though (p=0.068). The impact 
of the crisis dummies stay similar in both economic and statistical 
significance. Overall, the results are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 We repeat the baseline analysis on a country-by-country basis for the 
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external finance-dependent firms to ensure that our effects are not driven by 
one particular country. The results are presented in Table 3.3. For this 
analysis, we employ the larger raw samples from each country to make full 
use of the data (we do not use the aggregate sample based on GDP shares, 
as explained at the end of Section 3.3.1). 
 The findings in Table 3.3 confirm our aggregate analysis shown in 
Table 3.2 and are consistent across all five countries. However, the 
magnitude of the effects varies substantially. The Z-score has a positive and 
significant impact on the probability of substitution. A one unit increase in 
the Z-score is related to an increase in the probability of credit substitution 
between 8.2% (Germany) and 18.4% (France). The effect is the smallest in 
Germany because its financial system was less strongly hit by the financial 
crisis and long-term bank credit to SMEs is more common than in the other 
four countries. Also the results for the financial crisis are consistent for all 
countries, confirming that substitution is strongly dependent on the state of 
the economy as shown in Figure 3.1. The probability of credit substitution 
decreased significantly in both stages of the financial crisis in all five 
countries; the second stage of the crisis always has an even more negative 
impact than the first stage of the crisis. The probability of credit substitution 
during the second stage of the crisis decreases between 36.5% (Italy) and 
72.6% (U.K.). In additional analyses
9
 we find that the results are similar for 
the Altman’s Z-score and D_Crisis2 when we investigate firms from 
external finance-dependent industries: D_Crisis2 is significant in all five 
countries and the Altman’s Z-score in four countries (Germany is the only 
exception). Furthermore, we estimated the baseline model with interaction
                                                          
9
 Results are available from the authors on request. 
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effects between the explanatory variables and country dummies on the 
(unweighted) aggregate sample that consists of the country-specific raw 
samples. The results are in line with the ones we report in Table 3.3. We 
conclude that the effects of credit quality and the crisis on the substitution 
of bank credit for trade credit after a negative shock to bank credit are 
qualitatively similar but the magnitudes vary across countries.  
 In the next step, we investigate how much SMEs could substitute, using 
a modified version of the substitution indicator: the three-outcome SI3it.
10
 
This modified version has three possible outcomes: (1) negative 
complementary relation; (2) partial substitution; and (3) perfect 
substitution. Partial substitution refers to the situation where trade credit 
increases in year t to a lower extent than bank credit decreased in year t-1, 
while perfect substitution refers to the situation where trade credit increases 
in year t at least as much as bank credit decreased in year t-1. In other 
words, we investigate two different forms of substitution; the situation 
where firms do not fully fill the funding gap resulting from the decrease in 
bank credit and the situation where they do fully fill this gap. Table 3.4 
presents the results. We estimate the probability of partial or perfect credit 
substitution relative to the probability of a negative complementary 
relation.  
                                                          
10
 We also considered the elasticity of trade credit to bank credit as an alternative version 
of the substitution indicator. However, it turned out that the elasticity measured at the firm 
level is too volatile. The discrete SI3 indicator is more robust and implicitly depends on the 
elasticity as input. 
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 We find in Table 3.4 that perfect credit substitution is more likely the 
higher the credit quality of the firm. For firms with external finance 
dependence at the firm (industry) level a one-unit increase in the Altman Z-
Score increases the probability of substitution with 17.4% (15.1%). 
Furthermore, substitution decreased in both the first and second stages of 
the financial crisis. There is a sharp drop in substitution in the second stage 
of the crisis (odds ratios of 0.35-0.55 in most specifications). By and large, 
these results are consistent with those from Table 3.2 and 3.3. 
3.4.2 Credit quality and stages of the crisis  
 We have shown that the probability of substitution went down 
significantly during both stages of the financial crisis, but it declined more 
strongly during the second stage, as posited in Hypothesis 2. We now 
investigate in Table 3.5 whether the impact of credit quality on the 
probability of substitution varies during the different stages of the financial 
crisis. We perform this analysis for the full sample and the sample of 
firms/industries that have demand for credit (EFD firms/industries).  
 We obtain three results. First, there is a significant and negative impact 
of the second stage of the crisis on the probability of substitution in all 
samples. Hence, after the failure of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008 the 
probability of substitution decreased significantly compared to the pre-
crisis period. Second, for the full sample the interaction term between Zit-1 
and D_Crisis1 is significantly negative, suggesting that high credit quality 
firms are less likely to substitute bank credit for trade credit. This finding is 
plausible for the full sample where we do not limit the analysis to firms that 
have demand for credit. High credit quality SMEs are likely to have  
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Table 3.5: The impact of credit quality during the financial crisis 
This table reports results from the logit regression analyses where SIit is regressed on the Z-score, a 
dummy indicator for the first and the second stage of the crisis, the interaction terms between the 
previous two, a vector of control variables (cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, inventories, firm 
size, and ROA), and a set of country and industry dummies. This regression analysis informs how the 
explanatory variables increase or decrease the probability of substitution between short-term bank 
credit and accounts payable.We report the Odds-ratios with the p-values in parentheses for each 
explanatory variable. ***, **, * indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
    (1)   (2)   (3) 
    
  
  
  
  
  
Full Sample EFD Firms EFD Ind. 
Z(t-1) 
  1.125     1.139     1.119   
  (0.000) ***   (0.000) ***   (0.007) *** 
                    
D_Crisis1 
  0.900     0.810     0.837   
  (0.424)     (0.149)     (0.393)   
                    
D_Crisis2 
  0.565     0.587     0.597   
  (0.000) ***   (0.000) ***   (0.009) *** 
                    
D_Crisis1*Z(t-1) 
  0.906     0.930     0.847   
  (0.018) **   (0.126)     (0.028) ** 
                    
D_Crisis2*Z(t-1) 
  0.928     0.899     0.909   
  (0.070) *   (0.022) **   (0.186)   
                    
Control Variables   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Country dummies   Yes   Yes   Yes 
Pseudo R2   0.028   0.034   0.045 
Number of obs.   8,825   7,040   3,651 
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alternative sources of debt available (e.g., credit from the owners, friends or 
family) during the first stage of the financial crisis, likely to retain sufficient 
earnings to fund their operations, or they simply shrink by decreasing 
leverage. Consistent with this reasoning, this effect disappears in the 
analysis for EFD firms. Third, for the sample of firms with demand for 
credit (EFD firms, both at the firm and industry level) the interaction term 
between Zit-1 and D_Crisis2 has a significantly negative impact on the 
probability of substitution, suggesting that even high credit quality firms 
had difficulties in compensating for the negative shock to bank credit 
supply with trade credit. Hence, suppliers’ willingness to lend shows a 
similar pattern as the one of banks. Moreover, the findings are consistent 
with the fact that trade credit insurers reduced their coverage, increased 
retention amounts and risk premiums when the crisis deepened (e.g., 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2012). 
3.4.3 Credit quality and financial constraints  
 It is possible that the observed effect of credit quality on the probability 
of substitution is non-monotonically related to the level of financial 
constraints, as stated in Hypothesis 3. The concept of financial constaints is 
related but not the same as financial distress, as pointed out in the literature 
(e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). To analyze this 
issue, we interact the Z-score (Zit-1) with the KZ index quintile dummies 
(KZ_Qit), using the first quintile as reference category. Table 3.6 reports the 
results. 
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Table 3.6: The interaction of credit quality and financial constraints 
 
This table reports results from the logit regression analyses where SIit is regressed on the 
interaction terms between the Z-score and the quintile dummies for the KZ index, the 
quintile dummies for the KZ index separately, a vector of control variables (the different 
stages of the crisis, cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, inventories, firm size and ROA) 
and a set of country and industry dummies. This regression analysis indicates how the 
explanatory variables increase or decrease the probability of substitution between short 
term bank credit and trade credit. We report the odds ratios with the p-values in 
parentheses for each explanatory variable. ***, **, * indicate coefficients that are 
statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively, using robust standard 
errors clustered within firms.  
 
    (1)   (2) 
    
  
  
  
Full Sample EFD Firms 
Z(t-1) 
  1.155     1.166   
  (0.000) ***   (0.000) *** 
              
KZ_Q2*Z(t-1) 
  1.036     1.080   
  (0.533)     (0.249)   
              
KZ_Q3*Z(t-1) 
  1.096     1.151   
  (0.193)     (0.072) * 
              
KZ_Q4*Z(t-1) 
  1.163     1.238   
  (0.040) **   (0.009) *** 
              
KZ_Q5*Z(t-1) 
  0.953     0.975   
  (0.430)     (0.707)   
              
Control Variables   Yes   Yes 
KZ_Q Dummies   Yes   Yes 
Industry dummies   Yes   Yes 
Country dummies   Yes   Yes 
Pseudo R
2
   0.031   0.040 
Number of obs.   8,561   6,822 
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 The regression results indicate an inversely U-shaped relation between 
the probability of credit substitution and the interaction term for the full 
sample (column 1) and the sample of the external finance dependent firms 
(column 2). The finding indicates that credit quality is most important for 
the firms with intermediate financial constraints. For firms in quintile 3 (4), 
a one-unit increase in the Z-score of EFD firms increases the probability of 
substitution by 15.1% (23.8%) relative to quintile 1. The effect is 
statistically significant but less pronounced for the firms with no financial 
constraints because these firms have access to alternative forms of finance. 
In contrast, the Z-score matters less for the firms with the highest financial 
constraints because these firms are likely subject to credit rationing. 
 In addition, we repeated the regression with the quintile dummies for 
the WW index. The results for the interaction effects with the WW index 
are similar to those for the KZ index, indicating that the probability of 
substitution exhibits the highest sensitivity to credit quality for the firms in 
the fourth quintile. We also considered the SA index (Hadlock and Pierce, 
2010), but we do not find any significant interaction effects of this index 
with credit quality. One explanation is that the SA index does not 
sufficiently discriminate between the firms in our sample because they are 
all relatively small. 
 Finally, we conduct the baseline regression from Table 3.2 for external 
finance-dependent firms separately for each KZ quintile by country. The 
odds ratios of the Z-score in each KZ quintile group in the raw sample are 
plotted in Figure 3.2. All five EU countries display an inversely U-shaped 
pattern. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 3, confirming that firms 
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with a high credit quality and intermediate financial constraints exhibit a 
higher probability of credit substitution than others. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Odds ratios of the interaction terms between Z-score and KZ index quintiles 
3.4.4 Substitution between total bank credit and trade credit 
 In the previous analyses, we investigated SMEs’ reaction with trade 
credit in year t after a negative shock to their short-term bank credit in year 
t-1. On the one hand, it is possible that SMEs were also facing a negative 
shock to their long-term bank credit, especially those firms that had long-
term bank credit expiring during the recent financial crisis (Campello, 
Giambona, Graham and Harvey, 2012). On the other hand, it is most likely 
that firms substitute short-term bank credit (and not long-term bank credit) 
with trade credit (and vice versa). In other words, it is unlikely that firms 
substitute a permanent drop in long-term bank credit with a permanent 
increase in trade credit as the purpose and the cash flow effects of these two 
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types of debt finance are very different. 
 To provide further evidence on the substitution effects between bank 
credit and trade credit, we examine the response of trade credit in year t 
after a negative shock to total bank credit (short-term and long-term bank 
credit) in year t-1 (SIit
total
).  
 When comparing the results for the shock to total bank credit reported 
in Table 3.7 with the baseline results from Table 3.2, we see that the Z-
score and the financial crisis have a similar impact on the probability of 
credit substitution. For external finance-dependent firms, a one-unit 
increase in the Z-score increases the probability of substituting total (short-
term) bank credit for trade credit by 7.7% (9.9%). In addition, the 
probability of substituting total (short-term) bank credit decreases 34.0% 
(32.9%) during the first stage of the financial crisis and 55.2% (55.9%) 
during the second stage. The fact that the results do not change when we 
use long-term debt as input for the substitution indicator increases the 
reliability of the evidence because trade credit is a better substitute for 
short-term bank credit than for long-term bank credit because of its 
maturity match. 
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Table 3.7: The determinants of the probability of substitution for total debt 
This table reports results from the logit regression analyses where SIit
total is regressed on the Z-score, 
the different stages of the crisis, cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, inventories, firm size, ROA and 
a set of country and industry dummies. This regression analysis informs how the explanatory 
variables increase or decrease the probability of substitution between total bank credit and accounts 
payable. We report the odds ratios with the p-values in parentheses for each explanatory variable. 
***, **, * indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively, using robust standard errors clustered within firms.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.060 1.064 1.077 1.073
(0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) *** (0.001) ***
0.689 0.693 0.660 0.625
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
0.485 0.490 0.448 0.419
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
1.014 1.007 0.968 0.896
(0.825) (0.914) (0.652) (0.117)
0.914 0.877 0.878
(0.001) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
1.062 1.156 0.129
(0.751) (0.537) (0.596)
0.835 0.899 0.868
(0.154) (0.447) (0.302)
1.177 1.162 1.069
(0.106) (0.196) (0.558)
0.911 0.773 0.798
(0.770) (0.504) (0.557)
Pseudo R 2
Number of obs.
0.025 0.025 0.032 0.029
10,060 9,668 7,637 7,637
Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes No
Inv(t-1)
TangFA(t-1)
ROA(t-1)
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Z(t-1)
D_Crisis1
D_Crisis2
D_Aftermath
Size(t-1)
Cash(t-1)
EFD Firms
Full Sample Full Sample EFD Firms demeaned
(1) (2) (3) (4)
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3.4.5 Modified versions of the substitution indicator  
 In the above analyses we investigated SMEs’ substitution conditional 
on a negative shock to bank credit. We now consider two modified versions 
of the substitution indicator. First, to rule out that our results are driven by a 
selection bias, we repeat the baseline analysis with a substitution indicator 
that is unconditional on the nature of the shock to bank credit in year t-1 
(SI4it) as shown below. In other words, we now consider positive and 
negative shocks to SMEs’ bank credit in year t-1 to study their response in 
trade credit, as presented in Equation (3.5). 
 
 
1 if ∆Bit-1<0 ∩ ∆Tit<0 (complementary) 
2 if  ∆Bit-1<0 ∩ ∆Tit≥0 (substitution) 
 SI4it =               (3.5) 
3 if ∆Bit-1≥0 ∩ ∆Tit<0 (substitution) 
4 if ∆Bit-1≥0 ∩ ∆Tit≥0 (complementary) 
 
 The results of the multinomial regression are presented in Table 3.8. All 
probabilities are relative to having a negative complementary relation. In 
the least restrictive sample, we find that a one-unit increase in Altman’s Z 
increases (decreases) the probability of substituting bank credit (trade 
credit) for trade credit (bank credit) with 8.4% (10.3%). This means that 
firms with higher credit quality are more likely to use trade credit when 
bank credit is unavailable and that these firms are less dependent on trade 
credit when bank credit is available. Furthermore, we show that the 
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occurrence of a crisis decreases the probability of being in group 2, 3 or 4. 
In other words, a negative complementary relation is most likely to occur 
during a crisis. 
 
Table 3.8: Analysis on the probability of substitution based on SI4 
This table reports results from the multinomial regression analyses where the four-outcome variable 
SI4it is regressed on the Z-score, the different stages of the crisis, cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, 
inventories, firm size, ROA and a set of country and industry dummies. This regression analysis 
informs how the explanatory variables increase or decrease the probability of having a substitution 
relation (SI=2 or SI=3) or a positive complementary relation (SI=4) relative to having a negative 
complementary relation (SI=1). We report the odds ratios with the p-values in parentheses for each 
explanatory variable. ***, **, * indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors clustered within firms.  
 
 
 Second, the substitution indicator in Equation (1) does not take into 
account a potential change in bank credit in year t. However, this could 
impact the probability of substitution because if a decrease in bank credit in 
the previous year is fully offset by an increase in bank credit in the current 
year, then substitution is not necessary (and hence a complementary 
Dep. Var: SI=2 SI=3 SI=4 SI=2 SI=3 SI=4
1.084 0.897 0.965 1.097 0.889 0.966
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.057) * (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.119)
0.734 1.011 0.698 0.685 0.992 0.648
(0.000) *** (0.883) (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.926) (0.000) ***
0.488 0.768 0.374 0.443 0.770 0.321
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.000) ***
Control Variables
Industry dummies
Country Dummies 
Pseudo R2
Number of obs.
0.022 0.026
18,802 15,070
D_Crisis2
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
Yes Yes
(1) (2)
Full Sample EFD Firms
Z(t-1)
D_Crisis1
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relation becomes more likely). For this reason, we additionally condition 
the substitution indicator on either ∆Bit < 0 or |∆Bit| < |∆Bit-1| ∩ ∆Bit > 0. In 
other words, we only include cases where the negative shock to bank credit 
in year t-1 is not fully offset by a positive shock in year t. The results are 
presented in Table 3.9 and qualitatively confirm our previous findings.  
 
Table 3.9: Substitution controlling for contemporaneous shocks to 
bank credit 
 
This table reports results from the logit regression analyses where SIit  (with an aggregate negative 
shock to bank credit in year t-1 and year t) is regressed on the Z-score, the different stages of the 
crisis, cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, inventories, firm size, ROA and a set of country and 
industry dummies. This regression analysis informs how the explanatory variables increase or 
decrease the probability of substitution of short term bank credit for accounts payable. We report the 
odds ratios with the p-values in parentheses for each explanatory variable. ***, **, * indicate 
coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using robust 
standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
 
1.094 1.101
(0.000) *** (0.000) ***
0.730 0.679
(0.001) *** (0.001) ***
0.481 0.447
(0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Pseudo R 2
Number of obs.
0.029 0.034
6,346 5,041
Industry dummies Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes
Z(t-1)
D_Crisis1
D_Crisis2
Control Variables Yes Yes
(1) (2)
Full Sample EFD Firms
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3.4.6 Stratified random sampling  
 The previous analyses are based on a sample comprised of the largest 
SMEs from the five biggest EU countries. To rule out that there are 
selection effects due to firm size, we stratified our raw sample using firm 
size quintiles. For each country we select a number of firms by random 
sampling within each size quintile. This number equals the number of firms 
per country in the raw sample divided by five. We repeat this procedure 
100 times. We then re-estimate our main regressions for firms that are 
externally financially dependent for each of the 100 subsamples and report 
the mean regression statistics in Table 3.10. 
 For the regression corresponding to Table 3.2, we find in Table 3.10 
that the Z-score has a significantly positive impact on the probability of 
credit substitution, where the mean odds ratio is 1.113 (p=.000). In 
addition, in all 100 reiterations, the first and second stages of the financial 
crisis have a significantly negative impact on the probability of credit 
substitution, where the magnitude of the second stage is always larger than 
the first stage. The mean odds ratios are 0.681 (p=.000) and 0.478 (p=.000), 
respectively. When we repeat the analysis for the regression corresponding 
to Table 3.5, we obtain similar results on both the Z-score and the crisis 
dummies. The mean odds ratio of the Z-score is 1.123 (p=.000) and is 
positively significant in all 100 subsamples. For the first and second stages, 
the mean odds ratios are 0.685 (p=.024) and 0.549 (p=.000), respectively. 
The crisis dummies have a significant negative effect in 79 and 98 of the 
subsamples, respectively. The interaction terms between the Z-score and 
both crisis dummies are insignificant though. In the regression 
corresponding to Table 3.6 and Figure 3.2 (not reported here to conserve 
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space), we confirm the inversely U-shaped pattern for the interactions 
between the KZ index quintiles and the Z-score after the stratified random 
sampling.  
 Overall, our baseline results from Table 3.2, 3.5 and 3.6 remain robust 
when we repeat the analysis on the stratified random sample. 
 
Table 3.10: Stratified Random Sampling 
This table reports the average estimation results from the logit regressions in which we regress SIit  
on the Z-score, a dummy variable for the first and the second stage of the crisis, the interaction terms 
between the previous two, a vector of control variables (cash holdings, tangible fixed assets, 
inventories, firm size, and ROA), and a set of country and industry dummies for 100 randomly drawn 
stratified samples. For each country, the firms are divided in size quintiles and within each quintile 
we have drawn a fixed number of firms. The sample includes firms that are external finance-
dependent (EFD firms), as proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998) or only external finance-
dependent firms conditional on non-negative change in total assets. The table reports the mean odds 
ratios, the mean p-values, and the mean pseudo R-squares for the 100 regression analysis. ***, **, * 
indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, 
using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level.  
 
 
1.110 1.092 1.119 1.058
(0.000) *** (0.013) ** (0.000) *** (0.107)
0.681 0.676 0.682 0.417
(0.000) *** (0.001) *** (0.023) ** (0.001) ***
0.477 0.740 0.549 0.725
(0.000) *** (0.004) *** (0.000) *** (0.106)
1.000 1.177
(0.986) (0.022) **
0.961 1.018
(0.378) (0.421)
Control Variables
Industry Dummies
Country Dummies
Pseudo R2
Yes Yes Yes Yes
0.029 0.040 0.029 0.040
Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
D_Crisis1
D_Crisis2
D_Crisis1*Z(t-1)
D_Crisis2*Z(t-1)
Yes Yes
EFD Firms,
dTA≥0 dTA≥0
Z(t-1)
Replication Table 3.2 Replication Table 3.5
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EFD Firms EFD Firms, EFD Firms
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3.5 Analysis with matched bank-firm data 
 
 We carry out one more analysis that complements our previous 
evidence. The following analysis allows us to directly identify a causal 
relation between a decrease of bank credit supply in year t-1 and the 
potential response in trade credit in year t at the individual firm level. We 
do so by using rich matched bank-firm data on SMEs from Spain.
11
  
 For each firm and year, we observe the number and names of banks 
from which the SMEs obtain credit, resulting in a dataset comprised of 
59,534 bank-firm-year observations for the period 2005-2010. The changes 
in credit we observe in this dataset are effective changes in credit used by 
firms. This approach is consistent with the earlier analysis based on the 
substitution indicator that captures firms’ response to a negative shock to 
bank credit supply.
12
  
 To ensure that firms did not decrease their borrowings voluntarily 
(credit demand-side effect), but that banks cut lending to the firms (credit 
supply-side effect), we collect information on bank bailouts in the Spanish 
banking sector. The indicator variable Bailout equals one if the bank was 
eventually bailed out during the recent financial crisis, and zero otherwise. 
We follow the Bank of Spain and consider all types of government 
intervention: full bailout, capital infusion, debt guarantees, and other 
                                                          
11
 For the other EU countries we cannot use matched bank-firm data because either the 
information on the firms’ bank relationships is not available in ORBIS or it is time-
invariant and therefore not reliable. 
12
 It would be interesting to distinguish binding and non-binding shocks to bank credit 
supply. Unfortunately, information on unused lines of credit is not available in our 
database. We focus on binding shocks to bank credit supply, as the substitution indicator is 
based on changes in bank credit and trade credit. 
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instruments.
13
 The Spanish banks that were eventually bailed out, which are 
almost all the savings banks and some commercial banks, started to 
experience dramatic losses in 2007-2008. This situation arose due to the 
collapse of the Spanish housing bubble and the resulting losses from 
domestic mortgage lending and banks’ credit exposure to securitized U.S. 
subprime mortgages, which forced these banks to significantly reduce their 
lending activities (Illueca, Norden and Udell, 2014). This decrease in 
lending of bailed out banks was significantly stronger than that of banks 
that were not bailed out. Firms borrowing from bailed out banks faced an 
exogenous supply-side driven shock to their bank credit. Our identification 
strategy follows Puri et al. (2011), who study the change in rejection rates 
of German savings banks that are connected with Landesbanks that were 
(or were not) affected by the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. We consider 
only firms having demand for credit, i.e., those that are considered as 
external finance dependent (Rajan and Zingales, 1998).  
 The Bailout dummy is an ex-post indicator for banks that were forced to 
cut lending due to financial distress. However, being bailed out by the 
government is a result of fundamental financial problems. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the bailout banks had to cut lending during this 
time period. We also create a dummy indicator for savings banks that 
serves as an ex ante indicator of unhealthy banks. Savings banks in Spain 
were taking substantial risks before the 2008 financial crisis through 
aggressive loan growth. Their loan growth came to an abrupt end in 2007-
                                                          
13
 Details on the total amount of public money injected into troubled banks are available at 
the Bank of Spain’s website: 
http://www.bde.es/f/webbde/GAP/Secciones/SalaPrensa/NotasInformativas/Briefing_notes/es/notabe
040515.pdf. 
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Table 3.11: Analysis with matched bank-firm data 
This table reports the logit regression with matched bank-firm data from Spain. We regress SIit on a 
dummy variable for the financial crisis (Crisis), a dummy for banks that were bailed out (Bailout), 
the interaction variable Bailout*Crisis, time-varying firm controls, time-varying bank controls, and 
industry fixed effects. The variable NumberRel indicates the number of bank relationships per firm 
and year. In column 4 we replace the Bailout dummy with the SavingsBank dummy. We report odds 
ratios and p-values in parentheses. All firms are dependent on external finance following Rajan and 
Zingales (1998). ***, **, * indicate coefficients that are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively, using robust standard errors clustered at the bank-firm level. 
  
Crisis 0.717 0.857 0.860 0.879
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Bailout 1.080 ** 1.117 1.096 ***
(0.018) (0.001) *** (0.010)
Bailout*Crisis 0.841 0.842 0.837
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
SavingsBank 1.122 ***
(0.001)
0.828
(0.000) ***
1.329 1.335 1.336
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
1.459 1.452 1.452
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
0.356 0.366 0.366
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
TangFA(t-1) 1.087 1.097 1.099
(0.088) * (0.078) * (0.075) *
0.550 0.544 0.545
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
0.292 0.292 0.294
(0.000) *** (0.000) *** (0.000) ***
NumberRel 1.052 1.052
(0.000) *** (0.000) ***
Bank_ROA 0.061 0.095
(0.399) (0.476)
Bank_eqta 1.402 1.388
(0.534) (0.557)
Bank_depta 1.180 1.065
(0.175) (0.527)
Industry Dummies
Pseudo R
2
Number of obs. 59,534 51,304 51,304 51,304
Yes Yes
0.011 0.028 0.029 0.029
Size(t-1)
Cash(t-1)
Inv(t-1)
ROA(t-1)
Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SavingsBank*Crisis
Z(t-1)
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2008. As consequence of substantial losses, the savings banks were forced 
to cut lending, resulting in a significant credit crunch for SMEs in Spain. 
 We estimate the probability of credit substitution with the indicator 
variables for the financial crisis (Crisis), for either bailed out banks 
(Bailout) or savings banks (Savingsbank), the interaction term 
(Crisis*Bailout) or (Crisis*Savingsbank), firm controls, bank controls, and 
industry fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the bank-firm level. 
Table 3.11 reports the odds ratios and p-values from three specifications of 
the logit regression model.
14
 
 This analysis yields a clear result. The odds ratios of the interaction 
term Bailout*Crisis is significantly below one in all three specifications in 
Table 3.11. This finding indicates that firms borrowing from bailed out 
banks during the recent financial crisis had a lower probability of credit 
substitution than other firms. The effect is significant at the 1% level for the 
baseline model reported in column (1); it remains significant at the 1% 
level when we add a comprehensive set of time-varying firm and bank 
controls in columns (2) and (3) and when we change the Bailout dummy 
into the Savingsbank dummy in column (4). We also find that the 
probability of credit substitution significantly decreases during the financial 
crisis, as indicated by odds ratios for the variable crisis that range between 
0.71 and 0.88. Moreover, the odds ratio for the firms’ Z-score is above one 
and significant, confirming our earlier result that higher credit quality 
increases the probability of substitution. These results are consistent with 
                                                          
14
 An alternative model specification, in which the bailout indicator is defined as the ratio 
of total amount of funds injected by the government to total banks’ equity at the beginning 
of the financial crisis, leads to similar results. This alternative analysis is available from the 
authors upon request.  
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the previous ones for the five largest EU countries and the aggregate 
sample, as shown in Table 3.2 and 3.3. 
 We consider the analysis with matched bank-firm data as an additional 
piece of evidence for a causal effect: SMEs with demand for credit found it 
difficult during the recent financial crisis to (sufficiently) replace the drop 
in bank credit with trade credit. In other words, trade credit did not help to 
fill SMEs’ funding gap caused by the negative shock to bank credit supply. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
We investigate whether SMEs that have demand for debt finance use trade 
credit when they experience a negative shock to their bank credit and which 
factors influence their response over time and across countries. We base our 
analysis on a large sample of SMEs from France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the U.K. 
 We find that substitution and complementary relationships between 
bank credit and trade credit are on average equally likely during 2006-2011, 
but their importance varies substantially over time and across countries. 
Firms with higher credit quality are generally more likely to substitute 
credit. Substitution became less likely during the financial crisis and it 
further declined as the crisis deepened. High credit quality firms with 
intermediate financial constraints are the ones that are most likely to 
substitute. We carry out an additional analysis with matched bank-firm data 
and find that the SMEs that are hit more by the shock to bank credit supply 
are less likely to substitute. 
 We show that the probability of credit substitution depends on firms’ 
credit quality, financial constraints, macroeconomic conditions, and country 
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effects. Our study provides evidence on the dynamic interplay of the 
components of private debt in SME finance and has implications for the 
institutional design of the lending environment, economic policy and 
individual firm behaviour. The evidence suggests that substitution between 
the components of private debt is more difficult than considered in prior 
research. Trade credit is not the appropriate response to fill the funding gap 
that emerges when banks cut lending to SMEs. Policymakers should focus 
on enhancing financial stability, and thereby stabilize bank credit supply 
and the bank lending environment, rather than considering trade credit as 
alternative mode of external finance to mitigate the adverse effects on the 
real economy. SMEs can stabilize their access to bank credit by combining 
forward lending and spot lending and by diversifying across loan types and 
financial institutions. 
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Chapter 4 
Country and Time variation in European SME Finance 
Acknowledgement: This paper uses data from the EC/ECB Survey on the 
access to finance of entreprises.  
4.1 Introduction 
SMEs are considered as one of the most important contributors to economic 
development, due to their high growth opportunities. Therefore, it is very 
important that they have sufficient access to external finance to fund these 
growth opportunities. (Ayyagari, Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2007; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2005). However, the access to finance for 
SMEs is limited compared to big publicly listed firms, mainly due to 
reasons related to information asymmetry (e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; 
Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt, 2006). In addition to this, also cross-country 
variation and time variation affects the access to finance for firms (e.g. La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Ferrando, Popov and 
Udell, 2015).          
 This paper investigates how country variation and time variation 
affects the access to finance for SMEs in Europe. Europe is an interesting 
market due to the institutional heterogeneity across countries and the rapid 
changes in the recent economic environment (e.g. economic booms that 
were interspersed with the 2007-09 financial crisis and the 2012-13 
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sovereign debt crisis)
15
. The first two research questions of this paper are 
therefore: 1) How does the access to and the use of external finance differ 
across countries in Europe? and 2) In which countries are SMEs more 
likely to attract external finance during times of crisis in Europe?   
          
 In these research questions the focus is mainly on two things: (a) the 
access to external finance in general and (b) the access to individual sources 
of finance. The latter is important because SMEs use a different mix of 
financial sources than large firms due to a higher level of financial 
constraints (e.g. Ayyagari, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maskimovic, 2010; Carbo-
Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez and Udell, 2016). In this context it is 
especially interesting to investigate the access to bank finance on the one 
side and alternative finance on the other side because the costs of capital are 
generally lower than for alternative forms of finance, making it interesting 
to see if institutional development also results in SMEs having access to 
cheaper sources of external finance (e.g. Morris, 1976; Denis and Mihov, 
2003). Related, when banks cut their lending firms try to compensate this 
loss in credit availability by borrowing from alternative credit providers, 
such as suppliers (e.g. Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). However, Norden, van Kampen and Illueca 
(2017) and Casey and O’Toole (2014) report that the willingness of 
suppliers to behave as alternative lenders for SMEs differs across countries 
and during different stages of the economy. These papers barely reflect on 
                                                          
15
 This paper compares crisis-samples with post-crisis samples. The situation before the 
financial crisis is not considered because the data used in this paper starts in 2009. This 
means that I can compare how things have changed after the crisis, but I cannot compare 
how the crisis affected SME lending relative to the period directly before the crisis. 
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the different country characteristics that explain the likelihood of 
substitution though. Therefore, the third research question is formulated as 
following: In which countries are SMEs able to attract alternative forms of 
finance when bank debt is denied?      
  The country characteristics that this paper focuses on are banking 
sector development, stock market development and legal development 
because former literature confirms that these are (together with GDP per 
capita) the most important factors at the country level that influence firm 
finance (e.g. Giannetti, 2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 2008; Fan, Titman and Twite, 2012). This paper 
uses a broad set of proxies that are related to the three factors mentioned 
above
16
. The SME data is collected from the Survey of Access to Finance 
(SAFE) provided by the European Central Bank (EC/ECB  Survey on the 
access to finance for enterprises). This survey offers repeated cross-
sectional data since 2009 and asks European firms if they have made use of 
a particular form of finance (bank loans, lines of credit, trade credit, 
subordinated debt, informal finance, equity and internal finance) in the past 
six months. The answer could be “yes”, “no” and “this source of funding is 
not relevant for my firm”. Respondents that answer a question with “no” 
are firms who have demand for external finance but are unable to attract it, 
while respondents that answer with “not relevant” are firms that have no 
demand for external finance. The latter group is discarded from the sample 
ensuring that all firms have demand for external finance. In addition, this 
paper ensures that all firms have demand for external finance by excluding 
firms who reply that the investment needs of the firm have affected the 
                                                          
16
 See Table 4.2 and section 4.2 and 4.3 for more information about the country variables.  
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demand for external finance in a negative way. The access to finance for 
firms is affected by both supply and demand side rationales, while this 
paper is from a supplying perspective. For this reason, it is important to 
minimize the variation in demand in order to interpret the results from a 
supplying perspective.        
 This paper yields several results. First, it appears that most variables 
reflecting banking sector development and stock market development 
improve the access to external finance for SMEs. This also holds for 
creditor protection rights. From the banking sector variables, it appears that 
strongly competitive banking sectors, long debt maturity and high quality 
credit registries are the most important contributors. From the stock market 
variables, a high liquidity and a low volatility are the most important. 
Second, supplying firms located in countries with developed banking 
sectors, developed stock markets and strong creditor protection rights are 
more willing to step in as alte rnative lenders if their clients do not have 
access to bank credit. Third, it appears that bank finance (e.g. bank loans 
and lines of credit) is much more dependent on bank sector development 
than most alternative forms of finance, trade credit being a noteworthy 
exception. Fourth, it seems to be very difficult for SMEs to attract external 
finance during a crisis, but banking finance is easier to attract during a 
crisis in countries with highly developed banking sectors.  Stock market 
development and legal development do not seem to help SMEs in attracting 
finance during a crisis.      
 This paper makes several contributions. Firstly, it is to the best of my 
knowledge the first paper on SME finance that combines cross-country and 
time variation. Related studies (e.g. Beck et al., 2008a) are conducted 
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during a relatively stable time period while the economic situation in many 
European countries has been rather volatile over the last decade. The 2007-
09 financial crisis resulted is a large shock in credit supply (Ivashina and 
Scharfstein, 2010). Considering that SMEs are already more financially 
constrained than large firms this would imply that SMEs are most likely to 
be affected by this credit supply shock (Cowling, Liu and Ledger, 2012). 
Indeed, Ferrando et al. (2015) confirm that SMEs are more likely to be 
credit rationed during a crisis and that this probability is higher within the 
GIIPS countries. For this reason, it is relevant to know in which countries 
SMEs have more opportunities to acquire external finance during a 
recession because it provides suggestions for governmental actions that 
should be taken in order to prevent bankruptcies or shrinkage of SMEs on a 
large scale the next time when a crisis occurs.     
 Secondly, it investigates the effects of cross-country variation on SME 
finance more widely than in related research, because a more diverse set of 
country characteristics are considered. There is not yet a clear picture on 
how several factors jointly affect the access to SME finance, in spite of the 
consensus from the literature that proofs that banking sector development, 
stock market development and legal development are important drivers of 
the access to finance for firms (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Giannetti, 2003; Bancel and Mittoo, 
2004; De Jong, Kabir and Nguyen. 2008). Previous works either consider 
only one of the three factors above or measure those three factors in a 
narrow way. For example, Beck et al. (2008a) measures banking sector 
development by the amount of private credit provided in the commercial 
sector, while a developed banking sector is not only characterized by its 
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size but also characterized by its competition, loan maturity, risk and 
information asymmetry. It is important for policy implications to 
investigate how these set of variables jointly affect the access to finance to 
find out which variables have the most dominant effects on SME finance. 
In this way, policy makers know which components are most important to 
be influenced in order to improve the access to finance for SMEs.   
 Thirdly, this paper is one of the first to investigate cross-country 
variation on debt substitution. Several papers have investigated substitution 
between bank debt and trade credit at the firm level (e.g. Biais and Gollier, 
1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997) but did not investigate how debt 
substitution varies across countries. Debt substitution at the aggregate level 
alleviates the consequences of a negative shock to bank credit supply and 
therefore helps to either maintain macroeconomic growth or at least limit 
the macroeconomic decline (Norden et al., 2017). In addition, the abilities 
of SMEs to substitute different forms of external finance for each other 
serves as an indicator for financial flexibility. Investigating which country 
factors impact the financial flexibility of SMEs therefore has again 
important policy implications. This paper is also complementary to the 
works of Casey and O’Toole (2014) and Ferrando et al. (2015). Similar to 
this paper, Casey and O’Toole investigate the substitution of bank credit for 
alternative forms of finance with the SAFE survey. However, they focus on 
demand side rationales at the firm level (e.g. how does the level of financial 
constraints affect the likelihood of substitution), while this paper focuses on 
the supply sides at the country level 
17
. Ferrando et al. (2015) uses the 
                                                          
17 The variation at the country level investigated by Casey and O’Toole is limited to 
country dummies. 
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SAFE survey to investigate the effect of several supply shocks (i.e. 
different stages of the crisis) on the likelihood of SME’s being rationed 
from bank credit and on the likelihood that SME’s are resorting to 
alternative forms of finance. In addition, they investigate how these effects 
differ between the GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries. This paper provides a 
more detailed framework (that goes deeper that the GIIPS versus non-
GIIPS classification) on which country characteristics explain the 
differences in the access to and the use of finance for European SME’s.  
 This paper proceeds as following. Section 4.2 provides an overview of 
the related literature and presents the hypotheses. Section 4.3 elaborates on 
the data and empirical method. Section 4.4 provides the results and section 
4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Literature and Hypotheses 
4.2.1 Country Variation  
 The literature on how cross-country variation affects the access to 
finance has three limitations. First, most of the research is based on large 
publicly listed firms (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Bancel and Mittoo, 
2004). The general consensus from these papers is that cross-country 
differences in finance are largely explained by three sources of institutional 
heterogeneity; banking sector development, stock market development and 
the legal framework (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; La-Porta et al, 1997; 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999; Bancel and Mittoo, 2004; De 
Jong et al, 2008). Since these articles are mainly based on large publicly 
listed firms one cannot conclude that that SMEs are affected in the same 
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way. Second, most literature focuses on either the choice between debt 
versus equity or on short-term debt versus long-term debt. Alternative 
sources of finance like trade credit and informal finance are not considered 
while they are more relevant for SMEs because they have less access to 
bank finance and are unable to issue public securities (e.g. Ayyagari et al., 
2010; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2016; Norden et al., 2017). Moreover, for 
SMEs it is much more relevant to investigate the different forms of debt 
rather than the debt versus equity choice because the possibilities to issue 
equity are limited for SMEs since they do not have access to public markets 
and can only retrieve equity via venture capitalists, business angels and 
private equity (e.g. Cressy and Olofsson, 1997; Mason and Harrison, 1997; 
Poutziouris, 2001; Smolarski and Kut, 2009; Engel and Stiebale, 2014). 
Third, related papers only consider one of the three sources of institutional 
heterogeneity that were mentioned above or measure those three sources in 
a narrow way. For example, Beck et al. (2008a) and De Jong et al. (2008) 
measure banking sector development by the amount of credit that has been 
provided to the private sector while a developed banking sector is not only 
characterized by its size but also characterized by its competition, loan 
maturity, risk and information asymmetry.      
 Regarding banking sector development there is empirical evidence that 
firms located in countries with a more developed banking sector have faster 
growth rates because they can acquire debt more easily (e.g. King and 
Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998, 1999). 
However, SMEs might not benefit as much as large firms from a developed 
banking sector because of their higher levels of information asymmetry. 
Also, if a banking sector is dominated by a lot of big banks, SMEs might 
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not benefit from aggregately big banking sectors because there is empirical 
evidence that big banks mainly lend to big firms (e.g. Berger, Kashyap and 
Scalise, 1995; Strahan and Weston, 1996; Peek and Rosengren, 1998).  
Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.1ʹ are formulated as following:  
H1.1: Banking sector development has a positive effect on the access to 
external finance 
H1.1ʹ: Banking sector development has a stronger positive effect on bank 
finance than on alternative forms of finance.   
 As mentioned before, banking sector development is estimated by 
several proxies that are not only related to the size of the banking sector. A 
developed banking sector has the following characteristics: (a) it is big in 
size, (b) it is big in scope, (c) it is competitive, (d) it provides loans with 
longer maturities, (e) it has a low risk profile, (f) many bank clients are 
covered by credit registries and (g) the credit registries are of high quality. 
These seven proxies are used to estimate banking sector development. In 
Panel A of Table A1 the sub-hypotheses for H1.1 and H1.1ʹ are formulated 
for clarification purposes.         
 Regarding the effect of stock market development on the access to 
finance there is not that much consensus in the literature. Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1996) report that large firms located in developed 
countries with developed stock markets rely less on debt and more on 
equity, while the opposite is true for developing countries. On the one hand, 
this could mean that SMEs also rely less on debt because they would have 
easier access to private equity in countries with more developed stock 
markets. On the other hand, there are also papers that report a positive 
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correlation between banking sector development and stock market 
development (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998). 
Indeed, Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1996) also reports that stock 
market development diminishes information asymmetries in bank-customer 
relationships. Lastly, it is also possible that SMEs are not affected by stock 
market development at all because their opportunities to trade publicly are 
limited and many SMEs do not have the goal to get publicly listed anyway. 
Most plausible reasoning would be that SMEs do benefit from developed 
stock markets in two ways. First, in developed stock markets SMEs have 
easier access to venture capitalists and business angels. Second, lenders (of 
any kind) are more likely to provide credit in countries with stable and 
developed stock markets, because a good performing stock market indicates 
that market participants are optimistic about the current business climate 
and therefore creditors are anticipating low probabilities of default. 
Hypotheses 1.2 and 1.2ʹ are formulated as following:  
H1.2: Stock market development has a positive effect on the access to 
external finance 
H1.2ʹ: Stock market development has a stronger positive effect on bank 
finance than on alternative forms of finance.   
 A developed stock market has the following characteristics: (a) it is big 
in size, (b) initial public offerings occur more often (La-Porta et al., 1997), 
(c) has a strong liquidity and (d) has a low risk. These four proxies are used 
to estimate stock market development. In Panel A of Table A1 the sub-
hypotheses for H1.2 and H1.2ʹ are formulated for clarification purposes.   
 Regarding the legal framework Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
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(1998) report that the enforceability of debt contracts is an important 
contributor for firm growth. In other words, a stronger investment climate is 
created when the rights of creditors are better protected. Related, La-Porta 
et al. (1997) conclude that firms located in countries with French civil law, 
which are characterized by low investor protection and contract 
enforceability, have inferior access to external finance. Hypotheses 1.3 and 
1.3ʹ are formulated as following:  
H1.3: Legal development has a positive effect on the access to external 
finance 
H1.3ʹ: Legal development has a stronger positive effect on bank finance 
than on alternative forms of finance.   
 For the legal framework three characteristics are used; (a) the quality of 
the rule of law, (b) the quality and enforcement of creditor protection rights 
and (c) the quality of disclosure. These four proxies are used to estimate 
stock market development. In Panel A of Table A1 the sub- hypotheses for 
H1.3 and H1.3ʹ are formulated for clarification purposes.     
4.2.2 Time variation        
 It is known that banks cut their lending during recessionary times 
(Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994; Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994; Becker and 
Ivashina, 2014; Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2015) due to the 
increased levels of insecurity and the higher default probabilities of 
borrowers. This holds even more for the banks that are facing liquidity 
problems themselves (e.g. Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). This bank debt 
contraction further amplifies the adverse effects of the crisis resulting in a 
vicious circle because borrowers are eventually forced to shrink and forego 
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investment opportunities without sufficient access to bank credit (e.g. King 
and Levine, 1993; Beck, Levine and Loayza, 2000, Norden et al., 2017).   
 Before the 2007-09 financial crisis there where already great 
differences in the use of bank credit and the access to financial services at 
an aggregate level (e.g. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Martinez Peria 2007, 
2008; Beck et al, 2008a) even within Europe. It is likely that these 
differences where further amplified by the financial crisis because the 
severity and the length of the financial crisis differed a lot across the 
countries in Europe. For example, the German economy recovered in 2010 
with a 4.1% GDP growth while Greece experienced a drop of 5.5% in the 
same year (Eurostat, 2016). Given that SMEs already have difficulties in 
attracting external finance in combination with the fact that SMEs are more 
severely hit by negative economic shocks (e.g. Cowling et al, 2012) it is 
expected that SMEs have had disproportionally more difficulties in 
acquiring external finance during the recent financial crisis in 2007-09 and 
the sovereign debt crisis in 2012-13 (e.g. Behr, Foos and Norden, 2017). 
Ferrando et al. (2015) report that SMEs are more likely to get credit 
rationed during a crisis and that the probability of getting rationed is higher 
within the GIIPS countries. This indicates that countries with better 
financial systems and institutions should be more able to guarantee that 
SMEs can attract sufficient financing during recessionary times. 
Hypotheses 2.1-2.3 are formulated as following (see panel B of Table A1 
for the related sub-hypotheses if further clarification is necessary): 
 H2.1: SMEs have easier access to finance during a crisis in countries with 
developed banking sectors; relative to SMEs in countries with 
underdeveloped banking sectors. 
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H2.2: SMEs have easier access to finance in countries during a crisis with 
developed stock markets; relative to SMEs in countries with 
underdeveloped stock markets. 
H2.3: SMEs have easier access to finance in countries during a crisis with 
strong legal development; relative to SMEs in countries with weak legal 
development. 
4.2.3 Substitution   
 Generally, firms prefer long term debt to short term debt and bank 
finance over alternative forms of finance (e.g. Morris, 1976; Diamond, 
1991; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Denis and Mihov, 2003) due to the 
associated costs of capital.       
 The importance of bank credit relative to other forms of finance is 
highly dependent on the used lending technology
18
. In the context of SMEs, 
the importance of bank credit is highly dependent on relationship lending. 
In general, it can be stated that the importance of bank credit depends on 
the nature of the relationship between the bank and the borrower (e.g. 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995, 2006; Berger, Miller, 
Petersen, Rajan and Stein, 2005; Behr, Norden and Noth, 2013; Kysucky 
and Norden, 2016; Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2016). In 
other words, the stronger the relationship between the bank and the firm, 
the higher the importance of bank credit relative to alternative forms of 
finance.          
 However, bank-firm relationships and the importance of bank credit 
                                                          
18
 This issue is further addressed in section 4.4.5 Robustness  
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thereof differ across countries and over time. During the recent crises many 
banks were forced to cut lending to their clients, making their clients more 
dependent on bank debt with shorter maturities or alternative forms of 
finance such as trade credit and informal finance (e.g. Biais and Gollier, 
1997; Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Love et al., 2007; Garcia-Appendini and 
Montoriol-Garriga, 2013). In addition to this, bigger firms also have the 
opportunity to fall back on public debt (Becker and Ivashina, 2014). Casey 
and O’Toole (2014) investigate bank debt substitution for several 
alternative forms of finance
19
 from a demand-driven perspective for the 
initial euro countries (except Luxembourg). They conclude that firms who 
are either bank credit-rationed or self-rationed have a higher probability of 
using alternative forms of finance. They also report that the likelihood of 
substitution differs across the countries in the sample, but without 
elaborating on which characteristics explain these differences at the country 
level. Relatedly, Norden et al. (2017) report that the probability that a firm 
is able to attract trade credit after a reduction in bank credit is different 
across several countries. For example, the authors report that the likelihood 
of compensating a negative shock to bank credit with a positive shock to 
trade credit is higher in countries with a strong banking sector (e.g. 
Germany) compared to countries with a relatively weak banking sector (e.g. 
Spain and Italy). Therefore, it seems that strong banking sector 
development makes it easier to switch between different sources of finance. 
Also a developed stock market and a developed legal framework are 
important. When banks cut their lending in a stable stock market, 
alternative creditors are still able to estimate the future market conditions. 
                                                          
19
 The same used in this paper.  
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Moreover, in a developed stock market SMEs might substitute bank credit 
for finance from venture capitalists. A developed legal framework is 
important because alternative providers of finance are more likely to extend 
credit when their rights are better protected. Hypotheses 3.1-3.3 are 
formulated as following (see panel C of Table A1 for the related sub-
hypotheses if further clarification is necessary): 
 H3.1: SMEs in countries with developed banking sectors are more likely to 
substitute a negative shock to bank credit with alternative sources of 
finance. 
H3.2: SMEs in countries with developed stock markets are more likely to 
substitute a negative shock to bank credit with alternative sources of 
finance. 
H3.3: SMEs in countries with a strong legal development are more likely to 
substitute a negative shock to bank credit with alternative sources of 
finance. 
4.3 Data and Empirical Method  
4.3.1 Data  
 The data on the forms of finance that are used by SMEs is obtained 
from the Survey of the Access to Finance (SAFE) by the European Central 
Bank. This survey asks European firms about their access to different forms 
of finance. The survey offers repeated cross-sectional data and is conducted 
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semi-annually since 2009
20
. Large firms and firms in the financial sector 
are discarded from the sample. The survey data has three advantages over 
financial statement data. First, it is possible to retrieve data on whether the 
firm has made use of a particular form of finance within the past six 
months. This is not always possible for financial statement data, for 
example because a stable value in short-term bank debt could either hold 
that the firm did not attract new debt or that the firm has rolled over debt. 
Moreover, it is possible to distinguish between firms that did not need to 
attract external finance or firms that could not get external finance. By 
excluding the cases where firms did not need external finance it ensures 
that all firms in the sample have demand for external finance. As a result, I 
can neutralize the supply side rationales from the demand side rationales. 
Second, the survey provides data on the firm’s investment needs, which 
enables me to align the use of external finance with the investment needs of 
the firm. Through the exclusion of firms that have no investment needs (and 
therefore do not need external finance) a second method to disentangle 
supply and demand side rationales has been developed. Third, the SAFE 
survey includes data on the use of diverse forms of external finance like 
bank debt, banks overdrafts, subordinated debt, trade credit, subsidies and 
informal finance. This variety cannot be found for SMEs with financial 
statement data because of their limited reporting duties.    
 Since this dataset offers repeated cross-sectional data it was possible to 
                                                          
20
 In the survey of the first half of 2014 the SAFE survey reformulated some questions on 
the  use of external finance, which resulted in a big non-response bias and therefore 
creating a large break in the series. This was resolved in the survey for the second half of 
2014. For this reason, the first survey from 2014 is excluded from the sample. 
(https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/pdf/surveys/sme/methodological_information_survey_an
d_user_guide.pdf?e087e14f81422c89c80805263e1453ea) 
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investigate how frictions at the country level affect the access to finance in 
different time samples, putting a strong emphasis on crisis-samples versus 
non-crisis-samples. However, the SAFE survey does not offer sufficient 
longitudinal data
21
 (i.e. every survey round contains different firms) and 
therefore this study does not say anything on how sensitive firms are to 
changes in national frictions over time.     
 The SAFE survey is conducted semi-annually for the initial euro 
countries minus Luxembourg
22
 while the survey is conducted bi-annually 
(annually since 2013) for the other European countries. This results in 
particular countries being over- or underrepresented in the dataset. For this 
reason, 1,000 firms were selected at random for most countries that have 
more than 1,000 observations in the raw sample. For the biggest five 
European countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy and Spain) 2,000 firms 
were selected and for the Netherlands 1,500 were selected 
23
 in order to 
enhance the relative sizes of the countries in the sample. This procedure is 
repeated 100 times in order to rule out that the results are driven by a 
selection bias. The number of observations for every country is reported in 
Table A2 (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises). 
                                                          
21 Some firms in the sample do come back in several surveys so it is possible to obtain a 
small panel dataset from the SAFE survey, which has been done by Casey and O’Toole 
(2014). However, this would severely reduce the data coverage because only 10% of the 
firms are included in at least three of the fourteen surveys. In addition, the panel data is 
only available for 11 countries (see footnote 24), eliminating too much variation at the 
country level.  
22
 Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. 
23 The GDP of the Netherlands is much smaller than that of the big five, but much larger 
than that of the remaining countries. In 2013, Spain (#5) had a GDP of € 1.023 trillion, the 
Netherlands (#6) had a GDP of € 0.603 trillion and Sweden (#7) had a GDP of € 0.402 
billion.  
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4.3.2 Empirical Method 
 The main dependent variables from the SAFE survey are dummy 
variables that indicate whether or not a firm has made use of a particular 
form of finance (see section 4.3.1) in the past six months. In addition, the 
variable D_External is constructed that equals 0 if the firm has no access to 
any of the financing sources that are mentioned above and 1 otherwise. In 
the survey the following question is asked for all available forms of 
finance: “Can you indicate whether or not the firm has used the particular 
form of finance in the past six months?” (EC/ECB  Survey on the access to 
finance for enterprises). The dummy equals 1 if this question is answered 
with yes and 0 if answered with no. As indicated in section 4.3.1, 
respondents with the answer “this source of finance is not relevant for my 
firm” (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises) are 
excluded from the sample, together with firms who report that their current 
investment needs have a negative effect on their use of external finance.
24
 
25
 
In order to investigate if SMEs are more likely to attract bank finance over 
alternative forms of finance the results for the two forms of bank finance 
that are available from the survey (bank loans and lines of credit) are 
compared with the other forms of finance.     
 In order to investigate debt substitution, the substitution indicator (SI) 
                                                          
24
 For the SAFE survey the method of excluding firms that answer “this source of finance 
is not relevant to my firm” and the method of excluding firms that experience a 
deterioration in their investment needs are combined. Which means that I have a double 
identification strategy for the SAFE survey. 
25
 The survey provides a categorical variable on whether investments in fixed assets, 
working capital or corporate restructuring have impacted the demand for external finance 
in a positive, neutral or negative way. Firms who reply with “negative” on all three 
questions are excluded from the sample. See section 4.4.5 for  more information. 
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of Norden et al. (2017) is adopted. This indicator is a dummy equal to 1 if a 
decrease in bank credit is accompanied with an increase in alternative forms 
of finance and 0 otherwise. This implies that the investigation of the 
probability that a firm has made use of alternative forms of external finance 
is conditional on a firm being unable to attract bank credit. For the SAFE 
survey, this means that SI equals 1 (0) if the firm responds with “yes” 
(“no”) on the question “Can you indicate whether or not the firm has used 
the particular form of finance in the past six months?” (EC/ECB  Survey 
on the access to finance for enterprises) conditional on the answer to this 
question for bank credit being “no”. This dummy indicator is also 
comparable with the measurement of Casey and O’Toole (2014), where the 
use of alternative forms of finance is regressed on a dummy variable 
indicating a negative shock to bank credit. In my study, bank credit and 
alternative forms of finance are merged together in one variable. This has 
the benefit that it circumvents the endogenous relationship between both 
forms of finance. Also, the goal of the work of Casey and O’Toole (2014) 
is to address the relationship between bank constraints and the likelihood of 
attracting alternative sources of finance (demand driven), while the goal of 
this study is to explain which country characteristics affect the likelihood of 
substitution for bank constrained firms (supply driven), which naturally 
requires a different measurement.      
 The measurement of the financing variables introduces the limitation of 
the SAFE survey; it only provides the opportunity to investigate if firms 
made use of a particular source of finance, but not the volume of this 
source. Therefore, the survey is very useful to investigate to which forms of 
finance SMEs have access but it does not help to provide an answer on the 
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amount of finance that SMEs can acquire. However, the advantages 
mentioned in the previous section outweigh this limitation. The SAFE 
survey asks respondents what the result of the applications were if they 
applied for a particular source of finance; (1) got everything, (2) got 
between 75 and 99.9%, (3) got less than 75%, (4) refused because of high 
costs and (5) got fully rejected (EC/ECB  Survey on the access to finance 
for enterprises). The data confirms that approximately 75% of the firms that 
were not rejected received everything, and approximately 86% of the firms 
received at least 75% of the requested amount. These numbers indicate that 
the vast majority of firms who use a particular form of finance are able to 
attract a significant part of the required amount. For this reason, I can make 
the assumption that the impact of the variation in the volume does not have 
a big impact on the results.
26
 This study controls for firm size 
(approximated by sales) and firm profitability for the data from the SAFE 
survey. Firm size is a very important control variable because it captures 
many different things for SME’s. First of all, bigger firms are less sensitive 
to problems related to information asymmetry because they have a longer 
track record. Secondly, the access to finance is generally better for bigger 
firms. Moreover, firm size is one of the most important measurements of 
financial constraints as found by Hadlock and Pierce (2010). Thirdly, 
bigger firms generally have more opportunities to generate positive cash 
flows making them less dependent on external finance. The natural 
                                                          
26
 The data on the outcomes of the loan applications is not used in the regression analyses 
for two reasons. First, this data is only available for bank loans, lines of credit and trade 
credit. Second, the vast majority of answers that are given are either “applied and got 
everything” or “applied and got rejected”. For this reason, it is still difficult to make a 
classification between small and big volumes because the cases between “getting nothing” 
and “getting everything” are rare in the sample. 
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logarithm of the country’s GDP is added to the regression to control for the 
general economic development. Since the access to finance and the forms 
of finance that are used are also different across industries, industry fixed 
effects are added to the model. Country fixed effects are not included in the 
baseline analyses because some country characteristics barely vary over 
time. However, they are considered in the robustness section 4.4.5. 
 This study has three groups of country variables: banking sector 
development, stock market development and the legal framework. The 
variables representing banking sector development were explained when 
elaborating on Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.1ʹ. These variables are obtained from 
either the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) or the Doing 
Business Survey (DB), both provided by the World Bank. The variables 
representing stock market development were explained when elaborating 
on Hypotheses 1.1 and 1.2ʹ.  These variables are obtained from either the 
SDC Database or DataStream. The variables representing legal 
development were explained when elaborating on 1.3 and 1.3ʹ. These 
variables are obtained from the World Development Indicators Database, 
provided by the World Bank.       
 The time variable, crisis, is identified by a dummy variable equal to 1 
in the year 2009 (and 2012 and 2013 in an alternative measurement to 
address the effects of the sovereign debt crisis). Almost all European 
countries experienced a declining GDP per capita in those three years 
(Eurostat, 2016). An overview of the firm variables and country variables is 
reported in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 respectively. In Table 4.1 I use the 
definitions of the SAFE survey (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance 
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for enterprises) and in Table 4.2 I use the definitions by the World Bank 
(2016a, 2016b, 2016c).  
 On several variables in Table 4.2 several notes have to be made. For 
HI, the observations in 2009 were set equal to the value for HI in 2010 
because data was unavailable. This is a fair adjustment, because the H-
index is very stable over time. For the measurement of and more 
information about the Z-score for banks I refer to the works of Boyd and 
Graham (1986), Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt (1993). For more information about the importance of credit 
registries I refer to the works of Houston, Lin and Ma (2010) and Beck, 
Kysucky and Norden (2015).  The variable RISK has been multiplied with 
100 to make the scaling more comparable with the other variables. For the 
variables PROTECT and DISCLOSURE data was unavailable prior to 
2011. The values of these variables prior to 2011 are set equal to the value 
in 2011. These variables remain stable in the period 2011-2014 for 95% of 
the countries.  
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4.3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 4.3 presents the percentages of the firms in every country that 
have used a particular form of finance in the preceding six months before 
the SAFE survey was conducted (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance 
for enterprises). Countries with a similar legal origin are classified together 
in the table. This classification is based on the work of La-Porta et al. 
(1997) and Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007). Table 4.3 reports large 
variation in the use of different forms of finance both across and within 
samples of different legal origins. For example, only 34% of the firms in 
Scandinavian countries report that they made use of bank loans, while this 
is between 43% and 47% for the other types of legal origins. However, the 
variation within the other three samples is also bigger. For example, in 
Ireland 64% of the firms indicate that they made use of bank loans while in 
the UK only 36% reported to do so. The variation is bigger for alternative 
forms of finance, especially for trade credit and informal finance. For 
example, 84% of the firms in Ireland reported that they make use of trade 
credit while only 19%
27
 of the firms in Croatia and Slovenia reported that 
they make use of trade credit. There are also big differences between 
countries that are having the same legal origin regarding the use of trade 
credit. For example, 77% of the firms in Finland rely on trade credit while 
this is only 38% in Norway. In Poland, 66% of the firms reported trade 
                                                          
27 This number may look unrealistically low. However, the survey conducted in 2009 
drastically decreases the sample mean for all countries as shown in Figure 4.1. The 
numbers for the initial euro countries minus Luxembourg are highly similar to the numbers 
reported in the study of Casey and O’Toole (2014) who have used a subset of the SAFE 
survey rounds. 
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credit while only 31% did so in Hungary. The use of subordinated bank 
debt is generally low in most countries, as is the use of equity. The latter is 
not surprising because SMEs have limited possibilities in issuing equity. 
Despite of this, there is still a substantial variation across countries. When 
focusing on the big EU countries it appears that in Germany 30% of the 
owners have invested new equity in the firm, while this number is only 
12% in France.  
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Figure 4.1 presents the development of the use of the different forms of 
finance over time for the SAFE survey (EC/ECB Survey on the access to 
finance for enterprises). The first remarkable observation is the big increase 
in the access to external finance from 2009 to 2010/2011. In 2010, the 
world economy recovered from the financial crisis which explains this 
increase in the use of external finance because lenders are not tightening 
their money anymore and because firms are experiencing growth again 
which results in an increased demand for external finance in order to fund 
the new growth opportunities. The second remarkable observation is the big 
drop in almost all sources of finance in 2014. This result comes as a 
surprise, because the consequences of the sovereign debt crisis reached 
their peak in 2012 and 2013 (as most countries experienced a drop in GDP 
in those years). A possible explanation is that there has been a delayed 
effect of the sovereign debt crisis.  Tables A3a-c report the basic descriptive 
statistics of the country level variables. 
Figure 4.1: Development of the access to external finance over time  
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4.4 Results  
4.4.1 Cross-sectional variation in the access to external finance  
The baseline analysis covers how the use of a particular form of finance 
depends on country characteristics. The results are reported in Table 4.4 
(EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises). In this and all the 
following tables the mean parameters (Odds-Ratios and z-statistics) of the 
100 regressions are reported.       
 Five out of the seven variables for banking sector development have a 
significant and positive effect on the probability of acquiring external 
finance. SMEs have more access to external finance in countries with a big 
and competitive banking sector, with a strong focus on long debt maturity 
and where there is a lot of coverage by high quality credit registries. A one 
standard deviation
28
 increase in bank size increases the probability of 
having access to finance with 3.7%. A one standard deviation increase in 
competition increases this probability with 11.6%. For maturity, credit 
registry coverage and credit registry quality these effects are 5.0%, 3.1% 
and 7.0% respectively. For the two most significant variables; competition 
and quality of credit registries this would imply that SMEs in Germany are 
30.1% more likely to have access to external finance than SMEs in Spain, 
based on the difference in competition in the German and Spanish banking 
sector (2.6 times the standard deviation). For the quality of credit registries 
the difference between Germany and Spain equals exactly one standard 
deviation. These results are most of the times supporting the hypothesis 1.1 
indicating the SMEs benefit from developed banking sectors in general.  
                                                          
28
 See table A3    
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 Firms located in countries with a liquid and low volatility stock market 
and where firms get publicly listed more frequently have easier access to 
external finance, while a big market cap actually reduces the likelihood of 
attracting external finance. An explanation for this is that liquid stock 
markets with a low risk profile are signals of stable economies with low 
information asymmetry, having a positive effect on the willingness of 
lenders to extend credit. This relationship only seems to hold in bank-based 
economies, but not in market-based economies (economies with a higher 
market cap). A one standard deviation increase in the number of IPO’s, 
stock liquidity and risk increases the probability of attracting external 
finance with 7.1%, 8.1% and -14.9% respectively. For the most significant 
variable, risk, a difference of one standard deviation is equal to the 
difference between the Netherlands and Greece. Three out of four variables 
are support for hypothesis 2.2, indicating that SMEs benefit from developed 
stock markets in general.       
 Creditor protection rights have a positive and significant influence on 
the probability of attracting external finance. A one standard deviation 
increase in the quality of the creditor protection rights increases the 
probability of attracting external finance with 7.4%. This implies that 
German SMEs have a 14.8% higher probability to attract external finance 
than Italian SMEs, since the difference is two standard deviations. This is 
plausible because creditors are more willing to provide finance when their 
rights to claim back the money are stronger protected, which is in line with 
hypothesis 1.3. However, the remaining variables are not in accordance 
with hypothesis 1.3. 
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4.4.2 Cross sectional-variation in the access to bank finance relative to 
alternative sources 
 Five out of seven banking variables (size and scope being the two 
exceptions) have a positive effect on the likelihood of attracting either bank 
loans or lines of credit (or both). This indicates that banking sector 
development has a positive effect on the access to bank finance. However, 
as opposed to former literature (e.g. Berger et al., 1995; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1998), size and scope do not seem to be important for the 
access to bank finance for SMEs. Much more important is the institutional 
and strategic context of the banking sectors (e.g. bank risk, competition and 
the coverage by high quality credit registries). The only form of finance that 
has similar z-statistics to bank loans and/or lines of credit is trade credit, 
indicating that SMEs in countries with a developed banking sector also 
have easier access to trade credit. The results are by and large support for 
hypothesis 1.1ʹ.        
 The results for the variables on stock market development on the 
individual forms of external finance are highly comparable to the results for 
external finance in general. This means that all types of finance providers 
are more willing to provide funding in a stable stock market, meaning that 
there are no differences between bank finance and alternative forms of 
finance. Therefore, there is no support for hypothesis 1.2ʹ. The results also 
show no empirical evidence for hypothesis 1.3ʹ.  
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4.4.3 Access to finance during the crisis  
 The results with the interaction effects between the country variables 
and the crisis dummy (dummy equal to 1 in 2009 and 0 otherwise) are 
presented in Table 4.5 (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for 
enterprises). As expected, the access to external finance was significantly 
lower during the financial crisis; the probability of having access to external 
finance is 65.3% lower during the 2009 financial crisis.   
 For the access to external finance in general there is little to no 
evidence that banking sector development helps to get access to finance in 
general during a crisis. However, substantial differences between the 
different forms of external finance exist. These differences are especially 
large for bank finance versus non-bank finance. For the two forms of bank 
finance (bank loans and lines of credit), at least one of them is positively 
influenced by all variables related to banking sector development (except 
CR_COVERAGE). On the contrary, most of the alternative forms of bank 
finance (except trade credit) are barely influenced by banking sector 
development. The findings indicate that the access to bank finance (relative 
to non-bank finance) during a crisis for SMEs is better in countries with a 
more developed banking sector. This is because developed banking sectors 
are generally better in withstanding negative shocks to the economy and 
therefore are better in extending credit during a crisis relative to less 
developed banking sectors. Referring back to the insignificant result for 
external finance in general, this indicates that firms who cannot access bank 
credit during a crisis do have problems in attracting alternative forms of 
finance. Overall, the results support hypothesis 2.1 for bank finance. 
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 An additional noteworthy result is that SMEs located in countries with 
a higher Z-score for banks are less likely to attract trade credit during a 
crisis, while they are more likely to attract bank loans. This supports the 
redistribution view of trade credit by Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-
Garriga (2013).        
 For stock market development there is the counterintuitive result that 
SMEs located in highly liquid stock markets have less access to external 
finance during a crisis, while SMEs located in highly risky stock markets 
have more access to external finance during a crisis. However, this result is 
largely explained by a substitution relationship between equity and lines of 
credit. As expected, it appears that SMEs located in countries with a highly 
liquid (highly risky) stock market are more (less) likely to issue equity 
during a crisis. However, counter-effects for lines of credit offset this. The 
results seem to indicate that SMEs rely more on equity when the stock 
market conditions are relatively favourable during a crisis and rely more on 
lines of credit when the stock market conditions are relatively unfavourable 
during a crisis. A strong legal framework does not seem to help SMEs in 
attracting external finance during a crisis. The exception that does support 
the hypothesis 2.3 is that a strong rule of law and a high disclosure score 
helps SMEs to attract more lines of credit and informal finance during the 
crisis. This means that banks and informal lenders are still willing to 
provide credit in these uncertain times when there is a strong government 
and when they have access to a lot of information due to the high disclosure 
requirement. However, having strong creditor protection rights reduces the 
likelihood of attracting external finance (both in general and for several 
individual forms of finance) during a crisis. In Table 4.4, PROTECT has a 
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positive effect on the access to finance. This finding indicates that creditor 
protection rights in Europe help SMEs to increase their access to external 
finance during economic booms, but these protection rights do not work 
optimally during a recession.       
 These results only hold for the 2009 financial crisis. The effects of the 
country characteristics on the access to finance during the 2012-13 
sovereign debt crisis do not report any meaningful results and are therefore 
not reported in this paper.  
4.4.4 Cross-sectional variation in debt substitution 
 As mentioned in section 4.3, substitution is measured by a dummy that 
indicates that the firm was able to attract a particular form of finance if it 
was unable to attract bank finance. This means that the substitution 
indicator (SI) equals 1 (0) if the firm has (no) access to trade credit, 
informal finance or equity conditional on having no access to bank credit 
(e.g. bank loans or lines of credit). In the analyses conducted in this and the 
following subsections, the substitution indicators are conducted for negative 
shocks to bank loans and lines of credit separately. In the regression 
analyses that investigate substitution for bank loans (lines of credit) the 
variable D_Creditlines (D_Loans) is included as a control variable. Table 
4.6a (4.6b) reports the mean values of the substitution indicators for bank 
loans (lines of credit) per country (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance 
for enterprises).        
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Table 4.6a: Summary Statistics Substitution Indicator – Bank Loans 
This table presents the average percentage of firms that do not have access to bank loans, but that are able to 
attract either trade credit, informal finance or equity instead during the period 2009-2015 within every country. 
The countries are classified on their legal origin, which is based on La-Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. 
(2007). In the table, the cross-country mean for every legal origin is presented, together with the standard 
deviation and the variation width.  
 
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
Nordic countries
Denmark 0.35 0.17 0.22
Finland 0.71 0.21 0.12
Iceland 0.48 0.19 0.09
Norway 0.23 0.13 0.13
Sweden 0.30 0.16 0.22
Mean 0.41 0.17 0.16
standard deviation 0.19 0.03 0.06
max – min 0.48 0.08 0.13
Germanic countries
Austria 0.44 0.24 0.16
Bulgaria 0.24 0.17 0.07
Croatia 0.09 0.08 0.05
Czech Republic 0.20 0.17 0.03
Estonia 0.41 0.23 0.08
Germany 0.28 0.23 0.19
Hungary 0.10 0.15 0.00
Latvia 0.16 0.33 0.28
Macedonia 0.51 0.27 0.10
Montenegro 0.43 0.36 0.00
Poland 0.48 0.15 0.07
Serbia 0.60 0.35 0.00
Slovakia 0.27 0.19 0.22
Slovenia 0.08 0.13 0.07
Switzerland 0.33 0.38 0.22
Mean 0.31 0.23 0.11
standard deviation 0.17 0.09 0.09
max – min 0.52 0.30 0.28
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Table 4.6a (cont 'd) 
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
Common Law countries
Ireland 0.77 0.31 0.14
Israel 0.66 0.40 0.53
United Kingdom 0.57 0.24 0.08
Mean 0.67 0.32 0.25
standard deviation 0.10 0.08 0.24
max – min 0.20 0.16 0.45
French-Roman countries
Albania 0.13 0.00 0.23
Belgium 0.24 0.20 0.12
Cyprus 0.47 0.03 0.05
France 0.23 0.13 0.09
Greece 0.55 0.17 0.12
Italy 0.51 0.14 0.11
Lithuania 0.38 0.41 0.41
Luxembourg 0.08 0.09 0.08
Malta 0.61 0.24 0.12
Netherlands 0.40 0.29 0.07
Portugal 0.35 0.15 0.06
Romania 0.32 0.24 0.05
Spain 0.41 0.23 0.08
Turkey 0.25 0.19 0.29
Mean 0.35 0.18 0.13
standard deviation 0.16 0.10 0.10
max – min 0.53 0.41 0.36
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Table 4.6b: Summary Statistics Substitution Indicator – Credit Lines 
This table presents the average percentage of firms that do not have access to lines of credit, but that are able to 
attract either trade credit, informal finance or equity instead during the period 2009-2015 within every country. 
The countries are classified on their legal origin, which is based on La-Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. 
(2007). In the table, the cross-country mean for every legal origin is presented, together with the standard 
deviation and the variation width.  
 
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
Nordic countries
Denmark 0.29 0.11 0.15
Finland 0.61 0.18 0.08
Iceland 0.35 0.18 0.06
Norway 0.14 0.13 0.09
Sweden 0.22 0.15 0.25
Mean 0.32 0.15 0.13
standard deviation 0.18 0.03 0.08
max – min 0.47 0.07 0.19
Germanic countries
Austria 0.35 0.18 0.15
Bulgaria 0.22 0.18 0.05
Croatia 0.09 0.01 0.03
Czech Republic 0.19 0.13 0.03
Estonia 0.12 0.08 0.01
Germany 0.21 0.21 0.16
Hungary 0.10 0.16 0.01
Latvia 0.15 0.34 0.22
Macedonia 0.72 0.50 0.00
Montenegro 0.24 0.25 0.11
Poland 0.45 0.14 0.04
Serbia 0.83 0.40 0.50
Slovakia 0.27 0.15 0.18
Slovenia 0.07 0.08 0.05
Switzerland 0.50 0.67 0.00
Mean 0.30 0.23 0.10
standard deviation 0.23 0.18 0.13
max – min 0.76 0.66 0.50
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Table 4.6b (cont 'd) 
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
Common Law countries
Ireland 0.77 0.29 0.15
Israel 0.56 0.31 0.56
United Kingdom 0.57 0.19 0.06
Mean 0.63 0.26 0.26
standard deviation 0.12 0.06 0.27
max – min 0.21 0.12 0.50
French-Roman countries
Albania 0.17 0.00 0.14
Belgium 0.22 0.18 0.09
Cyprus 0.34 0.04 0.06
France 0.19 0.09 0.08
Greece 0.43 0.07 0.08
Italy 0.40 0.11 0.07
Lithuania 0.46 0.42 0.44
Luxembourg 0.11 0.10 0.12
Malta 0.80 0.33 0.13
Netherlands 0.28 0.22 0.05
Portugal 0.31 0.12 0.04
Romania 0.27 0.21 0.04
Spain 0.35 0.17 0.06
Turkey 0.56 0.18 0.27
Mean 0.35 0.16 0.12
standard deviation 0.18 0.11 0.11
max – min 0.69 0.42 0.40
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 From Table 4.6 it appears that trade credit is the most likely alternative 
when banks cut their lending, because the average substitution indicator for 
trade credit is much higher than for informal finance and equity. In most 
countries, at least 30% of the firms are able to substitute a loss in bank 
credit (regardless of bank loans or lines of credit) for trade credit, while 
30% is rarely reached for the other two alternatives. This result is not 
surprising because the number of research papers on substitution between 
bank debt and trade credit (for SMEs) is much higher than the research 
papers on substitution between bank debt and informal finance/equity. The 
substitution indicator for trade credit also has a much higher standard 
deviation across countries, indicating that the likelihood of attracting trade 
credit after a negative shock to bank credit differs a lot across countries. 
Table 4.7a (4.7b) indicates which country variables explain the variation in 
the likelihood of substitution for bank loans (lines of credit) (EC/ECB 
Survey on the access to finance for enterprises).    
 Both tables indicate that substituting bank credit for trade credit is 
more likely in countries with developed banking sectors. Substituting a loss 
in bank loan availability is more likely in countries with big and 
competitive banking sectors where loans have a high maturity and where 
the credit registries are of high quality. These findings indicate that 
developed banking sectors also promote the use of supplier lending. A 
possible explanation is that providers of trade credit have the opportunity to 
fall back on their own banks (via factoring) when their clients default. 
These opportunities are not available for informal finance or equity finance, 
resulting in an insignificant or significantly negative relationship for those 
variables. Most of the results support the hypothesis 3.1.     
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Table 4.7a: Cross country variation in substitution for bank loans 
This table reports the mean parameters of 100 probit regression where the dummy that indicates if 
the firm was able to substitute bank loans for alternative forms of finance is regressed on several 
country characteristics. The reported coefficients for every variable are Odds-Ratios with the 
coinciding z-statistics in parentheses. The control variables are sales, profitability, GDP per capita,  a 
dummy indicating the use of lines of credit and a group of industry dummies. Only firms that report 
that the investment needs have not affected their need for external finance negatively are included in 
the subsamples.***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, with standard 
errors that are clustered at the country level.  
 
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
BSIZE 1.002 0.996 1.001
(2.45) *** (-2.89) *** (0.65)
BRANCH 0.996 1.003 0.993
  (-1.38) (1.37) (-2.58) ***
HI 2.387 0.934 1.384
(4.40) *** (-0.28) (0.97)
MATURITY 1.068 0.983 0.904
(3.76) *** (-0.75) (-3.32) ***
BANKZ 0.977 0.998 1.031
(-4.47) *** (-0.26) (3.58) ***
CR_COVERAGE 1.000 1.004 1.005
(0.41) (3.16) *** (3.72) ***
CR_QUALITY 1.271 1.029 0.853
(6.93) *** (0.66) (-3.07) ***
NR_IPO 1.006 1.005 1.007
(4.35) *** (2.51) *** (2.88) ***
 .
MARKETCAP 0.730 0.945 0.778
(-10.59) *** (-1.28) (-5.10) ***
LIQUIDITY 1.096 1.047 1.059
(6.85) *** (2.89) *** (2.87) ***
RISK 0.621 0.686 0.463
(-10.82) *** (-6.58) *** (-9.05) ***
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Table 4.7b: Cross country variation in substitution for lines of credit 
This table reports the mean parameters of 100 probit regression where  the dummy that indicates if 
the firms was able to substitute lines of credit for alternative forms of finance is regressed on several 
country characteristics. The reported coefficients for every variable are Odds-Ratios with the 
coinciding z-statistics  in parentheses. The control variables are sales, profitability, GDP per capita, a 
dummy indicating the use of bank credit and a group of industry dummies. Only firms that report 
that the investment needs have not affected their need for external finance negatively are included in 
the subsamples.***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively, with standard 
errors that are clustered at the country level.  
 
Table 4.7a (cont 'd)
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
RULE_LAW 0.975 1.010 0.979
(-6.87) *** (1.83) * (-2.79) ***
DISCLOSURE 1.012 0.936 1.002
(0.85) (-3.48) *** (0.09)
PROTECT 1.109 1.101 1.072
(6.44) *** (4.49) ** (2.27) **
Country Variables Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R Square 17.90% 9.50% 14.50%
N 5,024 3,038 3,384
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
BSIZE 1.002 0.995 1.003
(2.15) ** (-2.81) *** (1.34)
BRANCH 0.996 1.006 0.994
  (-2.34) ** (2.47) *** (-2.07) ***
HI 1.873 1.431 2.651
(2.74) *** (0.99) (2.46) ***
MATURITY 1.064 0.980 0.870
(3.13) *** (-0.78) (-4.08) ***
BANKZ 0.975 1.004 1.041
(-4.41) *** (0.56) (4.32) ***
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 Another important finding is that the median Z-score of banks reduces 
the likelihood of substituting a loss in bank credit for trade credit. The most 
likely explanation is that SMEs who are unable to attract bank credit 
located in countries with a high creditworthy banking sector are SMEs that 
Table 4.7b (cont 'd)
SI_Trade SI_Informal SI_Equity
CR_COVERAGE 1.000 1.005 1.007
(0.09) (4.25) *** (5.18) ***
CR_QUALITY 1.208 1.004 0.758
(5.20) *** (0.08) (-5.18) ***
NR_IPO 1.007 1.007 1.012
(4.19) *** (2.88) *** (4.49) ***
MARKETCAP 0.785 0.931 0.782
(-7.35) *** (-1.44) (-4.50) ***
LIQUIDITY 1.081 1.050 1.071
(5.19) *** (2.69) *** (2.93) ***
RISK 0.581 0.706 0.420
(-10.46) *** (-5.27) *** (-8.47) ***
RULE_LAW 0.975 1.018 0.983
(-5.91) *** (2.65) *** (-2.19) **
DISCLOSURE 1.005 0.942 0.969
(0.33) (-2.70) *** (-1.12)
PROTECT 1.108 1.133 1.107
(5.65) *** (5.13) *** (2.90) ***
Country Variables Yes Yes Yes
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R Square 15.60% 8.30% 17.20%
N 4,028 3,346 3,039
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are underperforming and therefore should not get credit. Moreover, these 
firms are the ones who are forced to fund themselves with internal equity,  
which explains the positive Odds-Ratio for BANKZ on SI_Equity.  
 Another interesting finding in the effect of credit registries. The 
coverage of credit registries increases the likelihood of substituting bank 
credit for informal finance or equity (but not for trade credit). Assuming 
that trade credit has lower costs of capital than informal finance and 
internal equity, it seems to indicate that the coverage of credit registries 
increases the likelihood of attracting finance with higher costs of capital. 
However, if the credit registries are of high quality, SMEs are more likely 
to substitute bank credit for trade credit (and less likely for informal finance 
or equity). Concluding, credit registries help SMEs to attract other sources 
of finance when banks cut their lending and the higher the quality of those 
agencies the lower the costs of capital of the funding they can acquire.   
 The effects of the stock market variables are similar as to earlier 
analyses, indicating that SMEs located in countries with a liquid and low-
risk stock market have easier access to alternative forms of finance when 
banks cut their lending. This finding indicates that stable stock markets do 
not only reduce information asymmetries between banks and customers but 
also between other types of lenders. This indicates that if an SME cannot 
get bank credit because the bank is forced to cut its lending, the SME 
should be able to access alternative sources of finance if it is located in a 
stable stock market. The results are support for the hypothesis 3.2.  
 For legal development, it appears that (as found in previous results in 
this paper) SMEs have easier access to alternative sources of finance after a 
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negative shock to bank credit when the rights of creditors are better 
protected.  
4.4.5 Robustness  
 As mentioned earlier, a very important contributor for the importance 
of bank credit (relative to alternative forms of finance) is the relationship 
that the firm has with its bank. The SAFE survey offers the opportunity to 
investigate the effect of banking relationships with the question “Do you 
feel comfortable to talk about financing with banks and obtain the desired 
results” (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises). 
Unfortunately, this question is only asked once every two years (once a 
year since 2013), resulting in a big loss of data. Table 4.8 shows the results 
of the baseline regressions when the answer to this question (yes or no) is 
included in the regression as a control variable (EC/ECB Survey on the 
access to finance for enterprises).      
 For expositional reasons, only the results for external finance in 
general, bank credit and lines of credit are presented. The results are highly 
comparable to Table 4.4, indicating that the findings hold when controlling 
for banking relationships. One interesting difference though is that the 
significance of the coverage by credit registries vanishes when controlling 
for relationship lending. This indicates that when SMEs have a strong 
relationship with their bank, credit registries are no longer necessary in 
order to get funding because the bank itself can obtain the required 
information.  
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Table 4.8: Cross-country variation – controlling for bank relationships 
This table reports the mean parameters of 100 probit regression where the source of finance is 
regressed on several country characteristics. The reported coefficients for every variable are Odds-
Ratios with the coinciding z-statistics  in parentheses. The control variables are sales, profitability, 
GDP per capita, a dummy for a strong bank-relation group of industry dummies. Only firms that 
report that the investment needs have not affected their need for external finance negatively are 
included in the subsamples.***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively,with standard errors that are clustered at the country level.  
  
  D_Ext   D_Loans   D_CreditLine   
BSIZE 1.002   1.000   1.000   
  (3.16) *** (-0.65) 
 
(-0.21) 
             
BRANCH 0.998   0.997   1.000   
  (-1.66) * (-2.41)   (-0.25) 
              
HI 1.752   1.002   1.423   
  (5.14) *** (0.00)   (2.89) *** 
              
MATURITY 1.030   1.030   1.069   
  (2.52) ***  (2.39) *** (5.15) *** 
              
BANKZ 1.006   1.012   1.005   
  (1.66) * (3.44) *** (1.32) 
              
CR_COVERAGE 1.000   1.000   0.999   
  (0.13) 
 
(0.05) 
 
(-0.92) 
            
CR_QUALITY 1.055   0.972   1.106   
  (2.90) *** (-1.43)   (4.88) *** 
              
NR_IPO 1.005   1.003   1.007   
  (5.97) *** (3.47) ***  (8.31) *** 
              
MARKETCAP 0.896   0.975   0.824   
  (-6.24) *** (-1.43) 
 
(-10.16) *** 
             
LIQUIDITY 1.030   1.030   1.015   
  (4.08) *** (3.80) *** (1.81) * 
              
RISK 0.857   0.886   0.758   
  (-6.08) ***  (-4.52) ***  (-10.21) *** 
              
RULE_LAW 0.992   0.999   0.984   
  (-3.02) *** (-0.44) 
 
(-5.15) *** 
             
DISCLOSURE 1.018   0.980   0.995   
  (1.90) * (-2.01) ** (-0.50)   
              
PROTECT 1.021   0.956   1.044   
  (2.34) ***  (-4.53) ***  (4.30) *** 
Control Variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R Square 5.1%   5.1%   5.2%   
N  11,388   8,653   8,341   
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 In the baseline analysis it is not possible to include country fixed 
effects because some country variables (for example, creditor protection 
rights and the disclosure requirements) exhibit low variation over time. 
Table 4.9 reports the results when country fixed effects are added to (and 
the variables that vary insufficiently over time excluded from) the 
regression models (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for 
enterprises).           
 The effects of the variables related to banking sector development and 
stock market development are similar to the baseline regression in Table 
4.4 in most cases. The majority of the variables related to banking sector 
development still have a positive effect on the access to external finance in 
general when controlling for country fixed effects. The same applies for 
bank credit specifically because either bank loans or lines of credit (or both) 
are positively affected by most banking sector variables. Two noteworthy 
changes are that banking competition and the quality of credit registries 
now has a significantly negative effect on the access to finance. For stock 
market development, it appears that the number of IPO’s and the inverse 
risk level remain significantly positive.      
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Table 4.9: Cross-country variation – country fixed effects 
This table reports the mean parameters of 100 probit regression where the source of finance is regressed on 
several country characteristics. The reported coefficients for every variable are Odds-Ratios with the coinciding 
z-statistics in parentheses. The control variables are sales, profitability, GDP per capita, and a group of industry 
and country dummies. Only firms that report that the investment needs have not affected their need for external 
finance negatively are included in the subsamples.***,**,* indicate a significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively, with standard errors that are clustered at the country level.  
 
 
  
  D_Ext   D_Loans   D_CreditLine   
BSIZE 1.011   1.006   1.016   
  (6.71) *** (3.44) *** (9.27) *** 
              
BRANCH 0.997   1.005   0.960   
  (-0.87) 
 
(1.11)   (-9.17) *** 
             
HI 0.576   0.370   0.261   
  (-1.72) * (-2.80) ***  (-3.31) *** 
              
MATURITY 1.036   1.033   1.071   
  (3.03) ***  (2.68) *** (5.52) *** 
              
BANKZ 1.021   1.014   1.006   
  (3.37) *** (2.19) ** (0.85) 
              
CR_COVERAGE 1.005   1.003   1.010   
  (5.39) *** (3.25) *** (8.84) *** 
              
CR_QUALITY 0.473   0.843   0.776   
  (-7.30) *** (-1.60)   (-1.97) ** 
              
NR_IPO 1.007   1.005   1.012   
  (7.31) *** (5.23) ***  (11.99) *** 
              
MARKETCAP 0.707   0.878   1.085   
  (-5.99) *** (-2.14) 
 
(1..21) 
             
LIQUIDITY 0.966   1.031   1.008   
  (0.97) 
 
(0.78) 
 
(0.20) 
            
RISK 0.774   0.802   0.832   
  (-7.88) ***  (-6.31) ***  (-5.10) *** 
              
Control Variables Yes  Yes  Yes  
Pseudo R Square 6.6%   4.8%   7.5%   
N  19,885   15,429   14,544   
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 As addressed earlier, I disentangle supply-driven rationales from 
demand-driven rationales by ensuring that all firms in the sample have 
demand for external finance. In the baseline analysis, this is done by 
excluding firms from the sample where the current fixed investments, 
working capital investments and investments in corporate restructurings are 
affecting the demand for external finance in a negative way for all three 
types of investments. In other words, the firm is included if at least one of 
the three types of investments is not affected in a negative way. However, 
the source of finance is also dependent on the nature of the investments 
(e.g. trade credit is highly dependent on working capital investments but not 
on corporate restructurings). For this reason, the baseline regression is 
repeated conditional on every type of investment separately (while 
controlling for the other two). The results are reported in Table 4.10 
(EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises). The results 
remain highly similar for investments in working capital and fixed assets. 
For investments in corporate restructuring, the results are much weaker (i.e. 
less significant variables). This is not unsurprising because corporate 
restructurings are very rare for SME’s, compared to investments in fixed 
assets and working capital.      
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 The goal of this paper is to find out which country characteristics 
related to banking sector development, stock market development and the 
legal framework affect the access to finance for SMEs. It is interesting to 
know how much the variation across countries improves the explanatory 
power of a model that only considers firm characteristics. Table 4.11 
reports two Pseudo R
2’s; the R2 of a stripped model with only firm 
characteristics and the R
2 
of a complete model with all types of country 
characteristics (EC/ECB Survey on the access to finance for enterprises). 
Next to this, the change in the R
2 
of the different types of country 
characteristics are reported in order to see which kind of country 
characteristics improve the explanatory power of the regression models the 
most. These incremental values for the Pseudo R
2’s are relative to the 
stripped model.  
Table 4.11: Pseudo R
2 
disentanglement 
This table reports the average Pseudo R2’s of 100 probit regressions where the sources of finance are regressed on 
firm characteristics only and on firm characteristics plus all country characteristics. In addition, the incremental 
average Pseudo R2 ‘s of the following four (groups of) country variables are reported; GDP per capita, banking 
sector development, stock market development and legal development. These incremental R2’s are the changes to 
the R2 of the model with the firm characteristics only.  
 
   
D_Ext D_Loans D_CreditLine D_Trade D_Subdebt D_Informal D_Equity
Stripped (Firm Variables Only) 2.51% 2.19% 1.37% 3.28% 3.78% 1.89% 1.90%
Total 4.53% 3.66% 4.48% 12.17% 15.12% 9.16% 11.51%
GDP per Capita 0.18% 0.19% 0.13% 0.12% 0.40% 0.28% 0.14%
Banking Sector Variables 1.41% 0.98% 1.43% 4.89% 4.60% 2.97% 3.73%
Stock Market Variables 0.99% 0.17% 1.96% 4.50% 6.04% 4.44% 6.64%
Legal Framework Variables 0.31% 0.72% 0.07% 0.72% 1.09% 0.48% 0.31%
Total Increment 2.02% 1.47% 3.11% 8.89% 11.34% 7.27% 9.61%
Total Psuedo R Squares
Incremental Psuedo R Squares
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 It appears that country variation is highly important in explaining the 
access to finance for SME’s. In the model for external finance in general, 
the Pseudo R
2 
almost doubles when all country characteristics are added to 
the model. For bank finance, the Pseudo R
2 
increases roughly 1.5 times for 
bank loans and it triples for lines of credit. For the alternative forms of 
finance the explanatory power increases with a factor 4 or higher. The 
abilities of SMEs to attract finance are quite volatile over time because 
especially banking sector and stock market development (i.e. time-variant 
country characteristics) increase the explanatory power of the models, 
while the increase in explanatory power is quite limited for legal 
development (i.e. time-invariant country characteristics). Surprisingly, 
stock market development seems to be even more important than banking 
sector development in explaining the access to finance for SMEs, because 
the explanatory power of stock market development is stronger in all 
specifications, except bank loans (taking into account that stock market 
development is estimated by four variables and banking sector development 
by seven). Stable stock markets indicate optimism about the future state of 
the economy, which is highly important because lenders are more willing to 
provide finance to risky and opaque firms (i.e. SMEs) if they foresee bright 
market conditions and have better information. However, stable stock 
markets are not helpful during times of crisis, as shown in Table 4.5. 
4.5 Conclusion  
This study investigates how several determinants of the banking sector 
development, stock market development and the legal framework at the 
national level affect the access to finance for SMEs.    
 The most interesting findings regarding banking sector development 
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are as following. First, almost all variables that approximate for banking 
sector development result in better access to bank finance during crisis 
periods, while banking sector development does not help to acquire 
alternative forms of finance during a crisis. This means that firms who 
cannot access bank credit during the crisis in a developed banking sector 
are likely to have troubles in acquiring external finance. Second, of all the 
proxies that estimate banking sector development, competition and bank 
loan maturity seem to be to most important ones. Bank loan maturity and 
banking sector competition are the only two proxies that have a consistently 
positive effect on the access to finance in general, the access to bank 
finance in particular (both during crisis and non-crisis periods) and on the 
ability to substitute bank credit for trade credit. Third, the results on the 
effects of credit registries on the access to finance are mixed. Both a strong 
coverage by and a good quality of credit registries increases the likelihood 
to attract external finance in general and bank credit specifically. However, 
strong coverage decreases the likelihood that firms can attract bank finance 
during times of crisis, while strong quality increases the likelihood of 
attracting bank finance. This implies that credit registries only improve the 
access to bank finance for SMEs during a crisis when they are of 
exceptional quality. In addition, strong coverage increases the likelihood 
that SMEs can substitute a loss in bank credit availability with informal 
finance or equity, but not with trade credit (which has generally lower costs 
of capital). Paradoxically, high quality of credit registries increases the 
likelihood of substituting bank credit with trade credit, but not with 
informal finance or equity. This means that better coverage by credit 
registries improves the likelihood of attracting alternative forms of finance 
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when banks cut their lending and the higher the quality of those credit 
registries the lower the costs of capital of the source of finance they can 
attract.         
 Regarding stock market development it appears that the occurrence of 
IPO’s, liquidity and the inverse risk have a positive effect on the likelihood 
of acquiring any form of external finance. Therefore, it also is not 
surprising that these three factors positively contribute to the likelihood of 
substituting bank credit for any other form of finance.    
During a crisis, firms in liquid stock market with a low risk level prefer to 
fund themselves with equity instead of debt, while firms fall back on bank 
debt in stock markets that are less liquid and have a higher risk level. 
 The evidence on legal development is rather weak. Only creditor 
protection rights seem to have the desired effect. SMEs located in countries 
with strong creditor protection rights have a higher likelihood of attracting 
external finance in general and bank finance specifically. Also, alternative 
lenders are more willing to step in when banks cut their lending when the 
creditor protection rights are strong. However, creditor protection rights do 
not seems to work optimal during times of crisis, because the likelihood of 
attracting any form of external finance during a crisis is actually lower in 
countries with stronger creditor protection rights.     
 These findings are important to take into account for policy 
implications regarding SME finance. Important examples are the rules set 
by the European Central Bank (ECB). This paper helps the ECB to better 
estimate how policy changes will affect the access to finance for SMEs in 
Europe and whether different countries are impacted by policy changes in 
different ways. It is also relevant for (future changes in) the Basel Accords, 
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since capital requirement probably effect SMEs in different ways than large 
firms and because the dependency on banks differs across countries.  
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Table A2: Cross-country sample size 
Table A2 reports the sample size across countries from both data sources. The numbers reported for the SAFE 
survey are firm-years because the SAFE survey does not have a time-series element (i.e. every time a survey is 
conducted the participating firms are different from the previous survey). The raw number represents the actual 
number of observations in the SAFE survey for every country, while the adjusted number represents the number 
of firms that is included in the regressions (the number of observations per country is capped at 1,000, 1,500 or 
2,000 depending on the size of the country). The weight represents the relative weight of the adjusted number to 
the total number of observations.  
Country raw Adjusted Weight 
Albania 294 294 0.9% 
Austria 5,508 1,000 3.0% 
Belgium 5,619 1,000 3.0% 
Bulgaria 2,024 1,000 3.0% 
Croatia 822 822 2.4% 
Cyprus 480 480 1.4% 
Czech Republic 1,921 1,000 3.0% 
Denmark 1,990 1,000 3.0% 
Estonia 473 473 1.4% 
Finland 5,032 1,000 3.0% 
France 12,990 2,000 5.9% 
Germany 12,856 2,000 5.9% 
Greece 5,693 1,000 3.0% 
Hungary 2,016 1,000 3.0% 
Iceland 503 503 1.5% 
Ireland 5,062 1,000 3.0% 
Israel 190 190 0.6% 
Italy 13,347 2,000 5.9% 
Latvia 833 833 2.5% 
Lithuania 900 900 2.7% 
Luxembourg 467 467 1.4% 
Macedonia 291 291 0.9% 
Malta 475 475 1.4% 
Montenegro 395 395 1.2% 
Netherlands 6,412 1,500 4.4% 
Norway 456 450 1.3% 
Poland 4,652 1,000 3.0% 
Portugal 5,771 1,000 3.0% 
Romania 2,033 1,000 3.0% 
Serbia 190 190 0.6% 
Slovakia 902 902 2.7% 
Slovenia 640 640 1.9% 
Spain 12,869 2,000 5.9% 
Sweden 1,983 1,000 3.0% 
Switzerland 100 100 0.3% 
Turkey 856 856 2.5% 
United Kingdom 4,472 2,000 5.9% 
Total 121,517 33,761 100% 
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Table A3b: Descriptive Statistics for Country Characeristics  
 (Stock Market) 
This table presents the mean values of the proxies for stock market development over the period 2009-2015 
within every country. The variables are winsorized at the level of 1 and 99%. The countries are classified on their 
legal origin, which is based on La-Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007). In the table, the cross-country 
mean for every legal origin is presented, together with the standard deviation and the variation width.  
  NR_IPO LN_MARKETCAP LIQUIDITY RISK 
Nordic countries         
Denmark 5 6.7 12.6 0.64 
Finland 4 6.2 14.0 0.82 
Iceland 0 1.6 n/a29 0.65 
Norway 12 5.3 14.5 1.19 
Sweden 18 5.8 14.6 0.76 
          
Mean 7.8 5.1 11.1 0.81 
standard deviation 7.2 2.0 6.3 0.22 
max - min  18 5.1 14.6 0.55 
          
Germanic countries         
Austria 4 6.8 11.9 0.69 
Bulgaria 2 5.8 n/a29 0.93 
Croatia 1 2.8 6.9 1.52 
Czech Republic 2 2.4 10.1 2.01 
Estonia 0 5.1 9.7 1.04 
Germany 24 6.7 11.1 0.75 
Hungary 1 1.0 11.5 6.69 
Latvia 2 5.0 n/a29 1.43 
Macedonia 0 3.3 n/a29 0.91 
Montenegro 0 9.2 n/a29 0.45 
Poland 31 3.5 13.5 1.50 
Serbia 0 6.2 n/a29 1.04 
Slovakia 1 4.6 3.8 0.56 
Slovenia 0 5.1 7.0 0.73 
Switzerland 6 6.4 14.2 0.72 
          
Mean 4.9 4.9 6.6 1.40 
standard deviation 9.4 2.1 5.5 1.52 
max - min  31 8.2 14.2 6.24 
 
  
                                                          
29
 The regressions also have been conducted without the variable LIQUIDITY in order to 
be able to include these countries into the analyses. The results remain similar and 
therefore the results are not reported. 
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 Table A3b (cont’d) NR_IPO LN_MARKETCAP LIQUIDITY RISK 
Common Law countries         
Ireland 7 7.6 14.0 0.54 
Israel 9 4.1 15.0 1.05 
United Kingdom 104 8.6 17.0 0.42 
          
Mean 40.0 6.8 15.3 0.67 
standard deviation 55.4 2.4 1.5 0.33 
max - min  97 4.5 3.0 0.63 
          
French-Roman countries         
Albania 0 0.0 0.0 0.00 
Belgium 5 6.9 12.8 0.52 
Cyprus 2 3.6 10.8 2.13 
France 29 7.6 15.1 0.61 
Greece 3 6.1 13.6 1.56 
Italy 17 7.4 16.8 0.77 
Lithuania 1 4.6 9.4 0.74 
Luxembourg 5 6.4 6.8 0.53 
Malta 0 4.5 7.8 0.52 
Netherlands 9 6.9 14.8 0.64 
Portugal 1 4.9 15.0 1.04 
Romania 2 5.7 13.6 1.03 
Spain 19 6.0 15.6 0.97 
Turkey 31 12.8 15.9 0.59 
          
Mean 8.9 6.0 12.0 0.83 
standard deviation 10.8 2.8 4.6 0.52 
max - min  31 12.8 16.8 2.13 
     
Overall Sample      
Mean 16.9 6.4 13.8 0.94 
Median 9.0 6.6 14.4 0.75 
Standard Deviation 23.6 1.6 2.5 0.95 
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Table A3c: Descriptive Statistics for Country Characeristics  
 (Legal) 
This table presents the mean values of the proxies for legal development over the period 2009-2015 within every 
country. The variables are winsorized at the level of 1 and 99%. The countries are classified on their legal origin, 
which is based on La-Porta et al. (1997) and Djankov et al. (2007). In the table, the cross-country mean for every 
legal origin is presented, together with the standard deviation and the variation width.  
  
  RULE_LAW DISCLOSURE PROTECT 
Nordic countries       
Denmark 99 7 8 
Finland 100 6 7 
Iceland 92 7 5 
Norway 99 7 5 
Sweden 99 8 6 
        
Mean 97.8 7.0 6.2 
standard deviation 3.3 0.7 1.3 
max - min  8.0 2.0 3.0 
        
Germanic countries       
Austria 97 5 5 
Bulgaria 53 10 9 
Croatia 64 3 5 
Czech Republic 83 2 6 
Estonia 86 8 7 
Germany 92 5 6 
Hungary 70 2 8 
Latvia 75 5 9 
Macedonia 52 7 6 
Montenegro 58 5 12 
Poland 75 7 7 
Serbia 45 4 5 
Slovakia 68 3 7 
Slovenia 81 4 3 
Switzerland 94 0 6 
        
Mean 72.9 4.7 6.7 
standard deviation 16.2 2.6 2.2 
max - min  52 10.0 9.0 
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 Table A3c (cont’d) RULE_LAW DISCLOSURE PROTECT 
Common Law countries       
Ireland 94 10 7 
Israel 80 7 6 
United Kingdom 93 10 7 
        
Mean 89.0 9.0 6.7 
standard deviation 7.8 1.7 0.6 
max - min  14 3.0 1.0 
        
French-Roman countries       
Albania 38 8 8 
Belgium 89 8 4 
Cyprus 83 7 7 
France 89 9 4 
Greece 66 5 3 
Italy 64 7 2 
Lithuania 76 7 6 
Luxembourg 96 6 3 
Malta 87 3 2 
Netherlands 97 3 3 
Portugal 83 6 2 
Romania 60 9 10 
Spain 83 5 5 
Turkey 58 9 3 
        
Mean 76.4 6.6 4.4 
standard deviation 16.9 2.0 2.5 
max - min  59 6 8 
    
Overall Sample     
Mean 83.1 6.4 5.0 
Median 88.4 6.0 5.0 
Standard Deviation 13.1 2.2 2.1 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
The chapters included in this dissertation try to deepen our understanding 
on the drivers of the access to and the use of finance for firms, with a strong 
emphasis on SMEs. In addition, it addresses the heterogeneity in the ways 
that firms can fund themselves. Therefore, after reading this dissertation the 
reader should better understand why different firms are funded in different 
ways. This dissertation considers the following topics, each covered in a 
different chapter; (a) which types of assets are the most useful sources of 
collateral in order to attract leverage; (b) whether the use of credit from 
banks and the use of credit from suppliers are moving in the same or in the 
opposite direction and what drives the interplay between them; (c) which 
frictions at the country level are the most important drivers of the access to 
(several sources of) finance and how the effects of these frictions differ 
during economic booms and recessions.        
 The first study is about the collateral channel, where the relationship 
between the asset structure and corporate leverage is investigated. This 
study confirms that property, plant and equipment is the best source of 
collateral for long-term debt, while accounts receivables is the best source 
of collateral for short-term debt. The usefulness of these assets to be used as 
collateral decreased during the financial crisis, but only for firms who are 
bank-dependent (i.e. financially constrained).     
 The second study is about the interplay between bank credit and trade 
credit, with a strong emphasis on the condition that bank credit decreases. 
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Under this condition, substitution relationships where firms can compensate 
the loss in bank credit with additional trade credit and complementary 
relationships where firms are also facing declines in trade credit are almost 
equally likely to occur. However, the first is much more likely to occur 
during economic booms, while the latter is much more likely to occur 
during economic recessions. Next to this, only firms of good credit quality 
are able to compensate a loss in bank credit with trade credit.  
 The last study is about the drivers of the access to finance at the 
country level. The study finds that firms who are located in countries with 
the following characteristics have the most access to external finance; 
highly competitive banking sectors, long debt maturity, high quality credit 
registries, high stock market liquidity, low stock market volatility and 
strong creditor protection rights. However, attracting external finance 
during a crisis is more difficult. Firms located in countries with highly 
developed banking sectors still do have more access to bank finance during 
a crisis relative to countries with underdeveloped banking sectors, but firms 
who are bank rationed in those countries also have difficulties in attracting 
alternative sources of finance.  
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
(summary in Dutch) 
De hoofdstukken in deze dissertatie trachten onze kennis te verdiepen 
omtrent de determinanten van de toegang tot en het gebruik van 
financiering van bedrijven, waarbij een sterke nadruk wordt gelegd op de 
financiering van het MKB. Tevens belicht het de diversiteit in de manieren 
waarop bedrijven zich kunnen financieren. Na het lezen van deze dissertatie 
behoort de lezer beter te begrijpen waarom verschillende ondernemingen 
zich op verschillende manieren financieren. Deze dissertatie behandelt de 
volgende onderwerpen, die elk in een apart hoofdstuk aan bod komen; (a) 
welke vormen van activa het meest bruikbaar zijn als onderpand met het 
oog op het aantrekken van vreemd vermogen; (b) of het gebruik van bank 
krediet en leverancierskrediet in dezelfde of in tegengestelde richtingen 
lopen en welke factoren ten grondslag liggen aan het samenspel tussen deze 
twee financieringsvormen; (c) welke fricties op landsniveau de sterkste 
invloed hebben op de toegang tot (diverse vormen van) financiering en hoe 
de invloed van deze fricties verschillen ten tijde van hoog- en 
laagconjunctuur.       
 Het eerste onderzoek gaat over het gebruik van onderpand, waar de 
relatie tussen de activastructuur en de passivastructuur onderzocht wordt. 
Dit onderzoek bevestigt dat vaste activa het best bruikbare onderpand is 
voor langlopende leningen, terwijl debiteuren (een vorm van vlottende 
activa) het best bruikbare onderpand is voor kortlopende leningen. De 
bruikbaarheid van deze activa als onderpand is gedurende de financiële 
crisis echter aanzienlijk gedaald, maar alleen voor bedrijven die bank-
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afhankelijk zijn (m.a.w. slechts beperkte toegang hebben tot 
financieringsvormen).       
 Het tweede onderzoek gaat over het samenspel tussen bank krediet en 
leverancierskrediet, waarbij een sterke nadruk wordt gelegd op de situatie 
waarin bedrijven minder bank krediet kunnen verkrijgen. Onder deze 
restrictie blijkt dat een substitutierelatie waarbij bedrijven het verlies in 
toegang tot bank krediet kunnen compenseren met extra leverancierskrediet 
en een complementaire relatie waarbij bedrijven ook minder toegang 
krijgen tot leverancierskrediet bijna even waarschijnlijk zijn om voor te 
komen. Echter, komt deze eerste situatie veel vaker voor tijdens 
hoogconjunctuur, terwijl de tweede situatie veel vaker voorkomt tijdens 
laagconjunctuur. Daarnaast zijn enkel bedrijven met een goede 
kredietwaardigheid in staat om het verlies in toegang tot bank krediet te 
kunnen compenseren met leverancierskrediet.    
 Het laatste onderzoek gaat over de factoren die de toegang tot 
financiering op landsniveau beïnvloeden. Het onderzoek geeft aan dat 
bedrijven die zich bevinden in landen met de volgende karakteristieken de 
meeste toegang hebben tot externe financiering; een competitieve bancaire 
sector, veel verstrekking van langlopende leningen, hoge kwaliteit van 
kredietregistratiebureaus, hoge liquiditeit op de aandelenmarkt, lage 
volatiliteit op de aandelenmarkt en sterke wetgeving omtrent bescherming 
van kredietverstrekkers. Echter, het aantrekken van externe financiering 
gedurende een crisis blijft lastig. Bedrijven die gelokaliseerd zijn in landen 
met een sterk ontwikkelde bancaire sector zijn nog in staat om 
bankleningen te verkrijgen tijdens een crisis, in vergelijking met landen in 
onderontwikkelde bancaire sectoren, bedrijven die echter al beperkte 
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toegang hebben tot bancaire leningen hebben in deze landen net zoveel 
moeilijkheden om alternatieve financiering aan te trekken. 
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